Get mad, stay mad : exploring stakeholder mobilization in the instance of corporate fraud and Ponzi schemes by McCormick, Cameron Anthony
University of Lethbridge Research Repository
OPUS http://opus.uleth.ca
Theses Business, Dhillon School of
2011
Get mad, stay mad : exploring
stakeholder mobilization in the instance
of corporate fraud and Ponzi schemes
McCormick, Cameron Anthony
Lethbridge, Alta. : University of Lethbridge, Faculty of Management, c2011
http://hdl.handle.net/10133/3248
Downloaded from University of Lethbridge Research Repository, OPUS
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GET MAD, STAY MAD: EXPLORING STAKEHOLDER MOBILIZATION IN 
THE INSTANCE OF CORPORATE FRAUD AND PONZI SCHEMES 
 
 
Cameron Anthony McCormick 
Bachelor of Commerce in Cooperative Education, University of Alberta, 2003 
 
 
A Thesis 
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies 
of the University of Lethbridge 
in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT 
Faculty of Management 
University of Lethbridge 
LETHBRIDGE, ALBERTA, CANADA 
 
 
© Cameron McCormick, 2011
  
iii 
 
 
Dedication 
This thesis is the result of an off the cuff remark she made on our very first date; 
therefore, I dedicate this to my darling wife: Krista. Without your love, kindness and 
support, I never would have started this journey, let alone finish it.  I love you and thank-
you for believing in me when no one else did.
  
iv 
 
 
Abstract 
Using a multi-case study, three Ponzi schemes were investigated: Road2Gold, Bernie 
Madoff’s empire, and the Earl Jones affair.  This grounded study used an inductive 
bottom-up methodology to observe and describe stakeholder mobilization in reaction to 
corporate fraud.  This research on stakeholder behaviour in Ponzi schemes articulates 
new theory for describing stakeholder behaviour and possible determinants for successful 
mobilization to action.  The data presented here point to a useful distinction in the 
stakeholders in a corporate fraud: reluctant and engaged stakeholders.  Reluctant 
stakeholders seek only interest-based ends, whereas engaged stakeholders have additional 
identity and ideological goals shared by a mobilized group. 
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Introduction 
 Corporate fraud is, unfortunately, not rare in the business world.  According to a 
2009 multinational survey by Price Waterhouse Cooper, “white collar”, or economic 
crime, is growing faster in Canada than in other developed nations, with 56% of 
Canadian companies reporting fraudulent activities in 2009 (Davies, 2009).  Types of 
schemes include banks offering financial products with higher than normal rates of 
return, but which are actually non-existent products; Ponzi (or pyramid schemes) where 
initial investors are paid returns by later investors; ‘pump and dump’ scams wherein a 
stock is heavily promoted to artificially inflate the value then sold off en mass by those 
holding the stock once the public succumbs to the bogus rumours.  No matter the 
financial vehicle, the perpetrators of the fraud have zero intent of running a legitimate 
organization, but merely using the company as a tool to access victims’ capital.  
Frequently, only a small number of key executives know of the fraudulent intent of the 
firm; thus, employees are often as victimized as those caught in the Ponzi scheme itself.  
Current stakeholder literature has focused on developing models for improving 
stakeholder relations with the company.  Generally speaking, there are assumptions that 
companies, and those companies’ executives, are operating in good faith rather than with 
malicious intent.  When examining cases of Ponzi schemes or other types of deliberate 
fraud, such assumptions simply cannot be made.  The current characteristics that are 
assumed for stakeholder group models do not match the characteristics of stakeholder 
groups victimized by organizations with malicious intent.  The majority of research on 
corporate fraud focuses primarily on human resource countermeasures and accounting 
policies to mitigate fraud (Holt & DeZoort, 2009; Satava, Caldwell, & Richards, 2006), 
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rather than examining problems stakeholders face when mobilizing to recover lost capital 
or changing firm behaviour.  This gap in the research presents an opportunity to 
understand stakeholder behaviour when confronted with corporate fraud. 
 It is within this context that this thesis explores stakeholder mobilization towards 
activism.  Three case studies are discussed and analyzed using a grounded theory 
approach.  Publically available articles on the Bernard ‘Bernie’ Madoff and Earl Jones 
scandals are examined, as well as this researcher’s notes on a recent Canadian case that 
appears to be a fraudulent.  During the axial coding phase of this study, numerous 
categories emerged which pointed towards the selective coding of stakeholder 
mobilization, namely: demographics of victims, relationship proximity of victims to 
fraudster, the pre-crisis attitude of victims towards fraudster, the post-crisis attitude of 
victims towards fraudster, the legal involvement pre-crisis, alacrity of legal enforcement 
post-crisis, emergent stakeholder leadership, overall stakeholder group cohesion, and 
finally, tactical goals of the group. 
 According to the data emerging from this study, group characteristics of 1) 
stakeholders identifying  themselves as  part of a group, 2) an  emergent leadership, and 
3) having  non-monetary goals (in addition to the commonly shared monetary ones), 
seem to be critical for the success of any attempt to mobilize a group of stakeholders into 
action.  Stakeholders’ perception of themselves (however reluctantly) as part of a single 
group relies on a few factors: close geographical proximity to one another, small 
population of stakeholders, the existence of pre-fraud relationships, and lack of monetary 
incentive.  The factors of having a good lawyer (or team of lawyers) to advise the group 
on navigating the legal system, a smaller population of victims, fewer groups of 
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stakeholders and having alternative goals beyond simple restitution seem to translate into 
a stronger leadership for the group.  Movements of stakeholders that self-identity as being 
part of a cohesive group, strong leadership and non-monetary goals might affect public 
policy and curb the growing issue of corporate fraud.  A new classification of 
stakeholders is offered to the body of stakeholder literature: reluctant and engaged 
stakeholders.  Reluctant stakeholders have an unwanted situation thrust upon them and if 
they mobilize, it is upon interest-based motivators: they want to recover what was lost.  
Whereas, the engaged cohort of stakeholders seem to pursue the satisfaction of interest, 
identity and ideological needs and as a result form into social movements that attract 
others to their cause.  These findings are valuable because they differentiate between 
reluctant and engaged stakeholders and suggest strategies that might mobilize 
stakeholders caught in a fraud beyond simple interest-based motivation, towards action 
based upon interest, identity and ideological motivators.  Non-governmental 
organizations (NGO) could use this research as a guide to understanding the increased 
probability of stakeholder mobilization and emergence of cohesive and engaged 
stakeholder groups. 
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Literature Review 
Business exists within a complex series of relationships between the organization, 
its employees, owners, clients, suppliers and community in which it operates.  All of 
these actors connected to an organization are known collectively as stakeholders.  The 
term stakeholder finds its genesis in the 18th century English case law, wherein a party 
would hold a stake in a financial transaction or hold in trust the proceeds of a wager 
(Johnson-Cramer, 2008).  Although stakeholders were not explicitly addressed in 
managerial literature for most of the 20th century, the idea of managing relationships with 
those affected by the conduct of business was certainly an undercurrent (Frederick, 1960; 
Smith, 1937).  It was not until Freeman’s (1984) pivotal work, Strategic Management: A 
Stakeholder Approach, where the paradigm of stakeholders began to be more fully 
articulated and explored. 
 The literature and evolution of stakeholder theory has followed a number of 
streams of research and complex models have been developed to describe and predict 
behaviour.  This review will follow the genesis of stakeholder theory into the modern 
streams of stakeholder theory.   
History 
R. E. Freeman’s work is still debated by those who study stakeholder theory 
(Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Dunfee, 2006; Frooman, 1999; Jamali, 2008; Jawahar & 
Gary, 2001; Phillips, Freeman, & Wicks, 2003).  At the most elementary level, Freeman 
suggested that “a stakeholder in an organization is (by definition) any group or individual 
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who can affect or is affected by the achievement of an organization’s objectives” (1984, 
p. 46).  Freeman offered a visual model wherein the organization was the hub of a wheel 
with spokes extending out to various stakeholders.  Although simplified and at an 
extremely macro level of analysis, the conceptualization of stakeholder 
interconnectedness was revolutionary, yet Freeman (1994) argued that for subsequent 
researchers, staying with such a simplified model would be too abstract to fully capture 
the complexity of relationships.  The definition of stakeholders offered at the time by 
Freeman was too broad; theoretically, it could have encompassed an entire population 
that could be directly or indirectly be affected by an organization’s operations, so various 
methods of identification of stakeholder groups and their saliency evolved (Goodstein & 
Wicks, 2007; Hendry, 2005; Kaler, 2002; Magness, 2008; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 
1997; Peteraf & Shanley, 1997; Rowley, 1997). 
 Freeman’s work has been widely cited as a method to identify key stakeholders 
and manage the politics inherent in those complex firm-stakeholder relationships 
(Freeman, 1994; Mitchell et al., 1997).  The strategy Freeman offers in this classic work 
could be used to glean insight on emerging issues which might threaten the firm; 
furthermore, Freeman was cognizant of the need for a system of corporate governance 
that harmonized the rational, process and transactional components within a stakeholder 
framework which would lead to a more ethical organization.  Freeman (1994) argued 
against the firm identifying stakeholders as separate and differentiated means to strategic 
ends.  Freeman, in later works, argued for a more egalitarian approach where 
management adopts an approach where all stakeholders are interconnected with the firm.  
Freeman (1994) suggested, in The Politics of Stakeholder Theory: Some Future 
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Directions that the stakeholders are clearly identified and he limited the group of 
importance to: “employees, financiers, customers, employees and communities” (p. 417) 
which further reinforces the idea of stakeholders being interconnected with the firm.  
Freeman’s theory posits that organizations that administer their relationships with 
stakeholders the most beneficially will endure and thrive, whereas organizations that fail 
to nurture their relationships are doomed (Freeman, 1984; Frooman, 1999; Rowley & 
Moldoveanu, 2003).  Furthermore, Freeman suggests that organizations manage their 
relationships and monitor how stakeholder interests change and evolve over time and 
react accordingly to maintain those relationships.  Freeman’s work suggests 
compartmentalizing stakeholder needs and supporting business functions to fulfil those 
stakeholder needs.   
 Debate amongst scholars as to whether a corporation’s duty is to, shareholders or 
stakeholders, has waged for almost 100 years (Bakan, 2004; Coelho, McClure, & Spry, 
2003; Friedman, 1970; Smith, 1937).  The stockholder model is heavily supported by 
property rights of shareholders, legal imperatives for the corporation, legislated 
governance mandates and public policy (Bakan, 2004; Friedman, 1970); however, in this 
model there is no allowance for the management of those affected (read: stakeholders) by 
the externalities created by the operations of the corporate entity (Naylor, Vernon, & 
Wertz, 1983).  Alternatively, in a stakeholder model, corporations are seen as citizens of 
their community and must act to increase stakeholder wealth not just shareholder wealth 
(Andriof & Marsden, 1998; Carroll, 1998; Matten, Crane, & Chapple, 2003; Waddock, 
2000).  For organizations to survive and increase their profitability, they must manage 
their reputation with the public, attempt to be good neighbours and become upstanding 
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citizens within their communities (Prado-Lorenzo, Gallego-Alvarez, & Garcia-Sanchez, 
2009; Sethi, 1975; Ullmann, 1985).   
More recently, scholars are beginning to move away from framing the argument 
as shareholders versus stakeholders, rather they argue about when and how corporations 
should respond to demands and increase shareholder value (Campbell, 2007; Hillman & 
Keim, 2001; Yang & Rivers, 2009).  For example, Yang and Rivers (2009) suggest that 
companies will adapt to the societal norms of their host communities in order to gain 
legitimacy amongst stakeholder groups.  Hillman and Keim (2001) are more specific, 
finding  that organizations create competitive advantage through their largesse,  thus 
increasing profitability and building reputation by  allocating resources towards primary 
stakeholders (i.e. clients, suppliers, human resources and the surrounding community).   
Stakeholder Salience & Engagement 
One would assume that identification of stakeholders would be extraordinarily 
simple; however, Freeman’s (1984) original definition is exceedingly broad and left 
management and academics with the difficult task of figuring out who has primacy and 
authority to have their needs addressed (Carroll, 1991; Husted & Allen, 2006; Mitchell et 
al., 1997; Ullmann, 1985). Rather than heed Freeman’s (1994) advice about viewing 
stakeholder groups as being interconnected with the firm and seen as a whole, the 
Mitchell et al. (1997) model was composed of a model which divided stakeholders into 
groups and assessed by three converging dimensions: legitimacy, power and urgency.   
The Mitchell et al. (1997) model is dynamic in a number of ways and is intended to be 
strategically employed by management to better cultivate stakeholder relations.   One 
manager might determine the salience of a stakeholder group differently than another 
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manager and thus give the stakeholder group greater attention than a peer; however, the 
situation may be so fluid that the salience of a stakeholder group could change in the 
view of management from moment to moment as shown in the comparative case study by 
Parent and Deephouse (2007).  By categorizing stakeholders within these 3 dimensions, 
management can determine which stakeholders are most deserving of attention within a 
dynamic model.    The Mitchell et al. approach was groundbreaking because it was the 
first conceptual model that posited and attempted to link the attributes which 
organizations management needed to assess when determining stakeholders salience.  
Mitchell et al.’s (1997) model is entirely firm-centric and allows for one-way analysis 
(i.e. from the firm to the stakeholder) and ignores the inverse, i.e. stakeholder 
identification of saliency in the firm’s hierarchy to affect change.   Challenging Mitchell 
et al.’s work, Frooman (1999) suggested that stakeholder groups with power would 
override any other factors for consideration.  Parent and Deephouse (2007) further 
challenged aspects of the Mitchell et al. (1997) model and suggest that the stakeholder 
attribute types are not balanced in primacy, and that power and legitimacy tend to 
dominate consideration for management with less emphasis on urgency. 
 Stakeholder theory has focused on the identification and engagement strategies 
for the most part (Rowley, 1997); however, there are divergent areas of research 
exploring activism and stakeholder influence strategies on the firm (Rehbein, Waddock, 
& Graves, 2004; Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003).  Firm-centric research, wherein the 
models focus on organizations exercising unilateral control over interconnected and 
dyadic stakeholder relationships, is pervasive (Burchell & Cook, 2006; Phillips et al., 
2003; Svendsen & Laberge, 2005; Swift, 2001).  Addressing stakeholder demands and 
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expectations leads to better relationships with those most affected by an organization’s 
operations, thus increasing an organization’s reputation and brand caché (Carroll, 1999; 
Jamali, 2008; Wood & Jones, 1995).  The majority of work within stakeholder 
engagement focuses upon how managers are, and should, be treating their stakeholders 
(Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Hine & Preuss, 2009; Swift, 2001).   Although the majority 
of stakeholder literature is written from the firm’s vantage point, there are researchers 
examining influencing strategies from the stakeholder side of the equation (Frooman, 
1999; Frooman & Murrell, 2005; Rowley, 1997; Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003; Zietsma 
& Winn, 2008).    
Frooman’s Model 
“Stakeholder Influence Strategies”, by Jeff Frooman (1999) argues from a 
Resource Dependency Theory (RDT) perspective as the basis for his strategy for 
stakeholder management.  RDT describes the building and maintaining of relationships 
when one party has a scarce resource that another party wants.  RDT has a number of 
assumptions built into it; namely, internal and external partnerships emerge from 
interactions and those interactions dictate the tone of future behaviours; the environment 
provides very scarce (and thus valuable) resources; and lastly, organizations will attempt 
to completely control the supply of resource for their product or service, which then 
forces customers and competitors to rely upon the firm’s good intentions (Ulrich & 
Barney, 1984).   Frooman’s (1999) case study on StarKist Tuna illustrates the power of 
stakeholders to influence corporate governance and strategic positioning.  The Frooman 
model suggested direct and indirect strategies that stakeholders can exercise to achieve 
their agenda and mitigate agency dilemmas.  In establishing the case, Frooman (1999) 
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employs Pfeffer’s (1972) idea of resource assignment and discretion in the furtherance of 
the firm’s business to build upon this case.  Frooman’s (1999) model suggested four 
overarching strategies in achieving corporate change by stakeholders, namely: direct 
withholding, indirect withholding, direct usage and indirect usage.  Moreover, Frooman 
(1999) argued that the level of interdependence between the firm and stakeholders plays a 
critical role in stakeholder strategy to elicit change, if there is little interdependence 
between firm and stakeholder groups, then there are fewer options available to 
stakeholders to force change in firm behaviour; whereas, strong interdependence between 
the firm and stakeholders translates to greater power stakeholder groups can utilize.  
Frooman’s model added these factors to the predominant focus on the organization’s 
influence on stakeholders.   
A notable limitation to Frooman’s model is an assumption of the company 
operating in good faith.  When considering corporate fraud, and given the lack of power 
stakeholders have in this situation, the strategies Frooman suggests would fail to 
accomplish anything as the unspoken assumption in RDT and the Frooman model is the 
continuance of operations and further transactions with customers (Rosen, 2009; 
Williams, 2008).  Stakeholders, who have been preyed upon when the firm operates in 
bad faith, have little recourse in influencing the firm directly due to the fact that the 
scarce resources no longer are in demand by the perpetrator of the fraud.  The 
organization that commits a fraud cannot be influenced by traditional stakeholders, nor 
can withholding strategies work as there is no intent to continue being a going concern.  
Typically, third parties (law enforcement or regulators) are required to assist in 
stakeholder redress when corporate fraud is committed. 
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 Frooman’s article argues for a model where, “stakeholders manage a firm to 
enable them to achieve their interests, possibly at the expense of the firm’s” (1999, p. 
192).  This idea was innovative as it was the first to suggest theory from the stakeholder 
side of the equation rather than management’s. The proposed stakeholder-centric view 
claimed to harmonize with ethics literature to create a more symbiotic understanding 
about the relationship between the firm and its stakeholders according to Frooman (1999; 
Frooman & Murrell, 2005).  Frooman’s model highlighted the power that comes from the 
nature of the relationship which contrasted with other models that focused upon 
individual firm power in stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984; Mitchell et al., 1997).    The 
RDT model that is argued, suggests a withholding strategy as a viable method for 
creating change in a firm (Frooman, 1999); however, if a transaction is started where 
clients enter in good faith but the firm’s intent is to act in bad faith, the initial strategy 
fails as there is nothing for stakeholders to withhold.   Furthermore, Frooman (1999) 
suggests that stakeholders will protect their interests, yet when considering instances of 
fraud and stakeholders are deceived they are unable to protect their interests on their own 
(Brearton, 2009; Fraud costs, 2011; Rosen, 2009; Sliter, 2006).   
The model does note though that there are assumptions built into it: “we assume 
that a firm seeks profits and, therefore, chooses efficient actions, then a stakeholder that 
requests a change in firm behaviour is implicitly asking the firm to choose a less efficient 
means to its end” (Frooman, 1999, p. 197) and that firms are “first and foremost profit 
maximizers” (Frooman, 1999, p. 198).  There are issues inherent with this assumption: 
first, the assumption of pursuing the most efficient actions is in direct opposition to the 
bounded rationality theory wherein satisfactory results are sought rather than the optimal 
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course of action (Simon, 1991).  Second, the assumption that a firm operates in the most 
efficient way, says nothing about whether it operates in a legal manner; the assumption 
leaves the stakeholders to exercise their power to bring the organization to align with a 
community’s ethical and moral norms.  For example, a company might be legitimate in 
its conduct but violate clean air regulations by exceeding pollution limits as the most 
efficient form of operations; it would then be the stakeholders’ responsibility to mobilize 
and demand a ‘less efficient means’ of production ceasing the practice.  These 
assumptions effectively limit the applicability of the theory to cases where corporations 
operate within legal limits and within full regulatory compliance.  They do not apply to 
situations of corporate fraud or Ponzi schemes. 
Rowley & Moldoveanu’s Model 
Stakeholder activism has increasingly been employed as a tactic to change 
corporate behaviours (Guay, Doh, & Sinclair, 2004; Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003). Tim 
Rowley and Mihnea Moldoveanu (2003) identified their model as, “...representing all 
stakeholders but reserve stakeholder group for a collective of individuals conscious of 
their membership in the group” (p. 205).  Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) grouped 
people into theoretical activist groups, discussing individuals in the aggregate as they 
were effective in firm influencing strategies in a synergistic group than lone individuals 
(p. 205).  Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) further note that their model is focused on, “... 
environmental activist groups, organized community groups, employee unions, and so 
forth...” (p. 205).  These groups might motivate stakeholders into action against a targeted 
firm (or firms); however, Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) note that customers and, 
cryptically, “individuals... of a common association with the focal organization” (p. 205) 
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are not covered by the theory.  The implication of customers and associates of the firm 
not being covered by the model suggests that the model is geared primarily towards 
secondary stakeholder groups (i.e. groups that do not directly benefit from the transaction 
but feel they have a vested interest in the transaction). 
Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) develop the theoretical model from two major 
frameworks: interest-based and identity-based (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Frooman, 
1999; Peteraf & Shanley, 1997).  The Rowley and Moldoveanu model suggests that 
interests are not a primary motivator for stakeholder mobilization as it does not easily 
translate into discernable action; moreover, the model indicates that stakeholders will 
mobilize based upon a desire to proclaim an identity as well as safeguard their interests.  
The authors advocate opportunities for future research, namely examination of leadership 
structure and how, “some groups may possess members who are concerned only with 
expressing this identity with like-minded others...” (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003, p. 
217).  In the case of corporate fraud, there exists another avenue of research: examining 
the social impact of being caught in a fraud and how that stigma might act as a motivator 
for group leadership and group mobilization.   
On closer inspection, Rowley and Moldoveanu’s work has major deficiencies 
when applied to examining stakeholder groups that have been involved in a Ponzi 
scheme: the authors note that, “leaders of a stakeholder group... will be less concerned 
about personal costs relative to interest-based benefits1 they gain” (Rowley & 
Moldoveanu, 2003, p. 216).  This would be contradicted if stakeholder leaders are 
                                                
1 The value and expected payoffs  relative to a stakeholder’s  interests (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003)  
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motivated because of their personal costs, i.e. lost investment capital which would clearly 
interest-based benefits.   
 Rowley and Moldoveanu’s (2003) model contains a number of propositions for 
consideration.  Firstly, Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) propose that stakeholder groups 
which have mobilized in the past against a targeted firm are more likely to come together 
again in the future, all things being equal; however, in the instance of fraud, it seems very 
unlikely that the same investors would be united against the targeted firm again.  
Secondly, the Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) proposition involves stakeholders taking 
pride in identifying themselves commonly via their association within the group; 
however, when corporate malfeasance is involved, there is no pride being part of the that 
collective and therefore there is difficulty identifying the members of the group.  Thirdly, 
Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) propose that stakeholders mobilize based upon interest 
overlap.  This proposition may hold true as stakeholders that have been affected have a 
vested interest in mobilization as they have lost capital, more so if they moved beyond 
their risk tolerance to further their investment.  As we can see then, the Rowley and 
Moldoveanu model is predicated upon the assumed ongoing and enduring relationship 
between firm and stakeholders. 
 There are holes within the current literature of stakeholder theory.  Freeman’s 
(1994) proposal argues for analysis of the interconnectedness of stakeholders to firms to 
manage the politics of relationships; however, this proposal is making the assumption of 
continued, mutually beneficial transactions between stakeholders and firm.  The majority 
of contemporary stakeholder literature is firm-centric and does not fully describe the 
stakeholder side of the equation.   The Mitchell et al. (1997) model seeks to segment and 
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assess the saliency of stakeholders but this model is only unilaterally valid from the firm 
assessing stakeholders and fails when reversed to stakeholders assessing the firm.  The 
stakeholder models typically flow from a management-centric perspective and do not 
offer much in describing stakeholder-centric models.  Frooman (1999; 2005) offers 
stakeholder-centric strategies to affect change in an organization; however, the model is 
based upon RDT and assumes continuance of firm-stakeholder relationships.   
Stakeholder models also fail to capture the effect of individuals and their motivations 
when considering fraud or illegal activities perpetrated by the firm.  Rowley and 
Moldoveanu (2003) suggest individual identification with a group, and prior 
mobilizations against targeted firms as the primary motivators for activism; however, in 
the case of corporate fraud, there is no pride in group identity nor would there have been 
prior opportunity to mobilize against a firm that is a repeat offender.    The missing 
factors present an opportunity to more fully describe the complex relationships between 
firm and stakeholder actor mobilizations generally given cases of corporate fraud and 
specifically considering Ponzi scheme. 
Social Movement Theory 
A social movement can most easily be defined as people working together to alter their 
society into a more preferred state (McCarthy & Zald, 1977).  Social movement theory 
has typically been the domain of sociological and political science researchers seeking to 
describe collective action; however, management scholars have turned to social 
movement theory to better explain activism (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Elsbach & Sutton, 
1992; Hambrick & Chen, 2008).  The origins of modern social movement theory can be 
found in the early part of the nineteenth century (Smelser, 1963), wherein academics 
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sought to explain the psychology of social movements.  Currently, there are a number of 
major theoretical streams of research within the social movement paradigm; four of these 
research streams will be discussed here: charismatic authority, new social movements, 
political opportunity, and lastly, resource mobilization.  There is an opportunity to bridge 
the social movement theory from sociology to management academia to better explain 
and understand stakeholder mobilization when confronted with corporate fraud. 
Charismatic authority.  The German sociologist, Max Weber, initially suggested 
the role of a charismatic leader as being a necessity for any social movement in his essay 
“The Sociology of Charismatic Authority” (1958).  Weber suggested that someone whom 
others tend to regard as having inherent ‘supernatural’ powers, is required to motivate a 
social movement (1958, p. 245).  A group moving towards action, Weber (1958) 
suggested, is necessitated on the presence of a charismatic leader in times of stress; 
moreover, Weber suggested that leaders, within movements which emerge in times of 
strife, are those who have charismatic tendencies.  
 Weber’s exact definition of charisma is disputed amongst sociologists who offer 
differing, and sometimes conflicting, interpretations (Alex-Assensoh, 1998; Jones & 
Kriflik, 2006; López-Pérez, 2009).  Ann Ruth Willner (1984) suggests a few of the traits 
that compose charismatic leadership qualities: originality, eloquence, and a high level of 
energy.  Charismatic leadership of social movements, Weber argued, was critical in 
“extraordinary times” (1958, p. 245).  Stakeholders suddenly finding themselves caught 
in a Ponzi scheme would qualify as being in extraordinary times and the emergence of 
leadership to organize the group might very well be required. 
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New social movements.  New social movement theory is based upon taking a 
cultural approach to understanding social movements.  There are two central aspects to 
the new social movement theory: first, the growth in the number of movements is a 
product of western society moving away from a post-industrial economy; and second, 
that the new, more numerous social movements are dramatically different than social 
movements of the past (Buechler, 2000).   European social theorists suggested that an 
increased sense of identity, coupled with action based on one’s ideology in pursuit of a 
more equitable society, was the basis for movements forging a new social order in the 
mid-twentieth century (Buechler, 2000).  An additional component to social movements 
beyond identity and ideological motivators was added by Bert Klandermans (2004): 
instrumentality.  Klandermans suggested that people are drawn to social movements 
based on a desire to change their circumstances (instrumentality2), they may feel pride in 
being a part of the group (identity), or they may simply want to express their beliefs 
(ideology).  This stream of research places particular emphasis on the idea of a socially 
constructed identity as a motivator towards group movement and there are clearly 
parallels with the work of Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003; den Hond & de Bakker, 
2007).   
 When considering the case of a fraud being committed against a group of people, 
the victims may indeed have an interest in getting their lost funds back (thus satisfying 
the interest/instrumentality component); however, the identity and ideological 
                                                
2 For the purposes of this paper, instrumentality and interest-based motivators will be treated 
interchangeably.  Instrumentality deals with the desire to change one’s circumstances, whereas interest-
based motivation is focused on protecting one’s interests.  So in the case of fraud, the instrumentality-based 
motivation is changing the situation back to the moment before what was lost occurred, and the interest-
based motivation is protecting one’s interests and also return the situation to the moment before what was 
lost occurred.   
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components of the new social movement theory are left unsatisfied.  There is no pride in 
being a victim of a fraud and expressing group ideology may be limited to wondering 
how the rule of law will deal with the fraudster.  Some stakeholders within the group may 
answer the siren’s call to engage in fighting the good fight and pursue the role of 
champion for changing their situation (thus satisfying the identity and ideological 
components necessitated by the new social theorists); however, stakeholders evolving 
into champions for their cause would dovetail more closely with the charismatic authority 
research stream rather than the new social theory stream.  Seemingly, the bulk of 
stakeholders bearing the impact of being caught in a tragedy (economic, environmental, 
etc.) do share a reluctant identity: victimhood.  The new shared stakeholder identity may 
be that of demoralized and disempowered victimhood, which may offer comfort via 
mutual moral support amongst the stakeholder cohort, rather than the pride in fighting to 
right the wrongs perpetrated against the group. 
Resource mobilization.  For a social movement to be successful, according to the 
resource mobilization theory, a group must acquire resources and mobilize the group 
towards action in accomplishing the movement’s ultimately goal (McCarthy & Zald, 
2001).  Resource mobilization theory has dominated social movement literature since its 
inception and is most closely in sync with RDT in business literature (Buechler, 2000; 
Frooman, 1999).  Both RDT and resource mobilization assume that individuals behave 
rationally, logically then an individual would not be compelled to join a social movement 
when they could enjoy the benefit without directing effort in collective action.  Resource 
mobilization theory suggests that individuals, in fact, behave rationally if the benefit of 
joining a social movement is greater than the cost of joining (Kendall, 2006; Olson, 
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1971).  Under the resource mobilization theory, group organization is paramount; group 
infrastructure is a critical resource for the group to be successful in their pursuits 
(Kendall, 2006; McCarthy & Zald, 2001).  The formation and enduring nature of groups 
is contingent upon accessibility to, and control of resources in resource mobilization 
theory (McCarthy & Zald, 2001) rather than in response to specific grievances.   
When stakeholders are confronted with corporate fraud there is indeed a specific 
grievance: a definite loss of stakeholder resources.  The loss of stakeholder resource 
(misappropriated investment capital, clean drinking water, unpolluted traditional hunting 
grounds, etc.) may be the catalyst for mobilization, regardless of the presence of requisite 
group resources necessitated in resource mobilization theory. 
Political opportunity.  Political opportunity theory is focused on understanding 
the external context that creates social movements; however, scholars are in disagreement 
about whether political opportunity theory is merely derivative of the resource 
mobilization theory (Buechler, 2000).  The origins of political opportunity theory sought 
to explain the political conditions of the time that allowed social movements to come into 
being, rather than discussing the longevity of the movement’s group cohesion (Eisinger, 
1972).  Later researchers modified the theory to gauge the responsiveness of politics to 
the emerging social movement (Meyer & Minkoff, 2004).   A favourable political climate 
for a social movement requires a few things: first, strong allies (or enemies) amongst the 
political elites in power; second, access to political power by the group; and third, 
political alignment instability (Tarrow, 1994).  Social movements, according to political 
opportunity theory, can both create or snatch political opportunities by utilizing existing 
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social networks, aligning with other movements, and/or crafting a collective identity to 
galvanize the social movement (Meyer & Minkoff, 2004; Tarrow, 1994).    
Ponzi and White Collar Crime 
White collar crime, or crimes committed by “a person of respectability and high 
social status in the course of his occupation” (Sutherland, 1983, p. 7) are increasingly a 
problem within Canada (Gray, 2007).  In 2008 there were almost 91,000 reported cases 
of fraud (Statistics Canada, 2009); this number coupled with the police assertion that only 
five percent of frauds are actually reported (Fraud costs, 2011) means that Canada has a 
very real problem with almost two million instances of fraud occurring each year.  
Stringent laws and empowered regulatory bodies are typical of western societies 
governed by the rule of law; however, failure to enforce those laws allows for increased 
instances of corporate crime and opportunity for corporate malfeasance (Gray, 2007; 
Sliter, 2006).   
There are several streams of research into fraud and Ponzi scheme from 
management scholars; however, the majority of these studies focus on accounting 
measures to mitigate embezzling by employees (Holt & DeZoort, 2009; Satava et al., 
2006; Sayles, 2006).  The major streams of research on fraud, from a management 
perspective, range from creating accounting systems (Pollock & Sumner, 2009; Satava et 
al., 2006) to human resource countermeasures.  Research has tended towards accounting 
counter-measures and processes to mitigate risk of fraud, psychological aspects for 
victims and perpetrators of fraud (Shadel & Pak, 2007), and human resource management 
techniques in creating a fraud-free workplace (Coelho et al., 2003; Young & Thyil, 
2009).  Scholarly articles focus on identifying avenues for fraud prevention in 
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accountancy through stringent audits or the psychology of how and why people get 
caught in fraud, yet in the management literature, there is little research exploring fraud 
beyond the balance sheet.   A few high profile cases of corporate fraud reflect badly upon 
all businesses and further the public sentiment that corporations are corrupt, thus 
contributing to an erosion of confidence in business.  This represents a missed 
opportunity for management scholars; by studying corporate frauds and Ponzi scheme, 
scholars can offer better understanding of stakeholder mobilization and influence 
strategies in these situations and further broaden the stakeholder paradigm.  
Canada holds the dubious distinction of being the only G20 nation without a 
centralized securities commission (Stein, 2010), which creates gaps between spheres of 
influence and muddies lines of jurisdiction for regional authorities and makes 
interprovincial enforcement almost impossible (Watson, 2009; Williams, 2008).  The 
lines of jurisdiction become unclear when a scheme occurs across provincial lines and 
into foreign countries and questions of authority to enforce judgements become apparent.  
A fraudster that is based in Ontario (for example) could lure British Columbians in a 
scheme; however, when it comes to enforcement and investigation, Ontario regulators 
have no authority to investigate matters in British Columbia (and vice versa) leaving the 
only the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to act as investigators.  It could be 
argued that these gaps in responsibility are what have placed Canada in the top 10% for 
reports of fraud per capita (United Nations, 2008).   
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Methodology 
 A multi-case study method was used to investigate the dynamic relationships 
between the company and stakeholders caught in a Ponzi scheme and how those 
relationships differ from traditional assumptions of corporate and agent integrity in 
interactions (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).  I proposed building 
theory using multiple cases due to the fact that there is virtually no research that has been 
explored that addresses stakeholder mobilization within the context of organizational 
fraud. 
Developing theory from case studies is most appropriate in this thesis because the 
intent is in-depth investigation into the phenomena and generation of theory rather than 
testing models.  I suggest this tactic as it is most suited to bring understanding to the 
actors’ (in this case, stakeholders’) subjective reality and explain the processes by which 
stakeholders construct their experiences (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Parent & Deephouse, 2007; 
Yin, 2003).      
Because of the absence of stakeholder-centric literature and relatively little 
amount of research into fraud beyond accountancy and psychology, selecting three cases 
of Ponzi scheme offered the best avenue to generate new theory.   A case study approach 
offers the greatest opportunity to allow new theory to evolve out of the events, in this 
study from multiple case studies, by the researcher (Eisenhardt, 1989b).  The goal of this 
thesis is the creation of new theory by describing the Jones and Madoff cases, with my 
own personal insight from Road2Gold.  These cases have created the necessary insight 
into strategies executed by stakeholder groups.  Interviews and editorial analysis from 
  
23 
 
diverse perspectives are already available in the Madoff and Jones cases; given the 
abundant availability of material, personal interviews are not necessary.   
A case study approach seems most prudent as it allows for the greatest 
understanding of phenomena by choosing particular cases, becoming immersed within 
the details, then comparing and contrasting the emergent themes across the cases.  Case 
studies tend to address how phenomena happen.  Utilizing multiple cases adds to the 
credibility of the thesis; this was achieved by analyzing similar outcomes from the 
individual cases.  The cases all had similar phenomena amongst cases, ergo support for 
the development of theory was substantial (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Yin, 2003).  The case 
study models suggested by both Maxwell (1996) and Eisenhardt (1989b; Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007) were used.  Each case was analyzed independent of the others.  Findings 
were then compared within a matrix to bolster reliability with the end result being 
emergent theory and a series of research questions.  
Strategy of Research and Basis for Theory 
 This thesis was designed primarily to explain stakeholder mobilization strategies 
and tactics used to influence a firm which acts in an illegal manner.  I proposed using 
three different cases of Ponzi schemes (which occurred at different times and 
geographical locations) in an effort to understand factors and phenomena common 
amongst the cases.   
By analyzing three different cases of corporate fraud, emergent themes and 
elements common to all three cases were examined to develop new theory on stakeholder 
mobilization (Dyer, Wilkins, & Eisenhardt, 1991; Eisenhardt, 1989b).  Allowing the 
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experiences of those involved in the cases to act as data allowed theory to develop, which 
further enhances the stakeholder paradigm (Dyer et al., 1991; Eisenhardt, 1989b).   
 Simultaneously shifting between data immersion (i.e. data nuances, and sense-
making characterizations from the literature) and development of theory (categorizing 
and sorting common elements) encouraged the creative process and greatly enhanced the 
objectives of this study (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Isabella, 1990; Strauss & Corbin, 1994).  
Because a grounded theory approach to data analysis was used, keeping an open mind 
throughout the study (and being mindful of other potential interpretations for the data) 
was crucial.   
Perspective of Researcher 
 The nature of this study required a grounded theory approach to data analysis, 
thus it is important to note the role that the researcher played.  Because I was caught 
within a Ponzi scheme, my role as an investigator presented a rare opportunity to give 
insight to motivations, objectives, strategy development and underlying feelings of 
stakeholders.  Data immersion, memoing, coding and inductive theory development 
relied on my creativity and certainly tempered my thesis findings.  However, as Strauss 
and Corbin noted regarding researchers employing grounded theory: researchers do not 
merely report on their observations, they “accept responsibility for their interpretive 
roles” (1994, p. 274). 
 I approached this situation with as clear a mind as possible.  I attempted to not 
have any theory in mind in order to mitigate researcher bias as much as possible.  By 
keeping free from theory initially, the study itself directed the flow towards theoretical 
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development (Eisenhardt, 1989b).  Realistically total elimination of researcher bias is 
utopian; however, approaching the data unfettered with preconceived ideas was 
paramount to the generation of ideas. 
 The current paradigm of stakeholder theory is primarily focused on regulatory 
oversight and company strategies for stakeholder relationship management.  This thesis is 
wholly from the stakeholder perspective and addresses those same stakeholder needs.  
Significance of Research 
 This thesis aims to offer new paths of stakeholder research and illuminate an 
unaddressed undercurrent of corporate fraud.  The majority of current management 
research on corporate fraud is contained (primarily) to the accountancy discipline (Baliga, 
1993; Satava et al., 2006; Sayles, 2006; Williams, 2008) thus there is a very significant 
gap presented to future researchers.  The theory that emerged from the selected cases 
might be extended to other cases beyond simple fraud: any time there are instances of 
corporate malfeasance this theory might be able to describe or predict the effectiveness of 
stakeholder mobilization.  
 This research could be of particular importance to NGOs in their efforts to hold 
governments and misbehaving corporations to account for their actions by managing the 
factors that lead to stronger group cohesion and social movements.   NGOs that have 
strong group identity, effective leadership and non-monetary goals may be more effective 
in changing public policy and holding misbehaving corporations to account. 
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Sampling and Collection of Data 
 To further understand the stakeholder experience, I used secondary source 
materials available on the World Wide Web and academic databases as this offered very 
divergent viewpoints regarding the Madoff and Jones cases.  In the Road2Gold case, I 
used the company’s own communiqués as a source, as well as my own diary, 
correspondence to the organization and other interested stakeholders. 
 The views of regulators, investors, whistleblowers and the perpetrators 
themselves were all represented in the available writings, making for a robust source of 
data for this study.  I limited my initial pool of articles to results returned in ProQuest 
with the search parameters: Ponzi scheme, fraud, Madoff and ‘Earl Jones’; currently, I 
had two Google web alerts set to deliver news results once a week for approximately 7 
months.  The first web alert was set up using the parameters: ‘Ponzi scheme’, ‘fraud’, and 
‘Bernie Madoff’; the second alert was set up with the parameters: ‘Ponzi scheme’, 
‘fraud’, and ‘Earl Jones’.   
 I then conducted selective sampling.  Selective sampling is the process of 
identifying populations (in this case the pool of articles written on Madoff and Jones) 
before the data collection phase (Draucker, Martsolf, Ross, & Rusk, 2007).   As new case 
literature was gathered and compared with the existing pool of literature to gain a deeper 
understanding of common elementary phenomena as suggested by Strauss and Corbin 
(1994).  I attempted to be as flexible as possible in the collection of data as the study 
evolved to further building theory from a multi-case study framework as suggested by 
both Eisenhardt (1989b) and Maxwell (1996).  It should be noted that selective sampling 
differs from quantitative sampling in that the goal is not to capture and explain variances 
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in data, but to triangulate data by gathering diverse and independent accounts to gain 
better insight into otherwise little understood phenomena.  As I became immersed in the 
data, major categories became readily apparent (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009; Corbin & 
Strauss, 1990; Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  Once the categories emerged from the data, I 
continued selectively sampling in order to further advance defining characteristics and 
develop propositions for future research.   
 I gathered data from very diverse sources, this acted as a type of triangulation 
which helped to qualify the justification for furthering knowledge and development of 
new stakeholder theory (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Maxwell, 1996).  To ensure construct 
validity and reliability, I ensured that the articles selected for this study fit within the 
context of Madoff’s scheme, Jones’ scheme and corporate fraud so as to not be 
confounding the study (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Maxwell, 1996).   
Data Analysis and Approach to Theory Creation 
 As was originally suggested by Glaser and Strauss, a grounded theory approach to 
data analysis was employed throughout this study due to the relative lack of research on 
this subject.  Analysis of data and emerging theory were continuously compared and 
contrasted throughout the collection and analysis phase as is typical for this type of 
research as the two are interrelated in the method (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Roderick, 
2009; Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  In practical terms, this meant that I reviewed the articles, 
I then coded emerging concepts from the data while capturing ideas and questions that 
arose in memos until no new concepts or ideas arose.  Once no new categories, concepts 
or ideas were arising from new articles or the data set, this was the point that I knew I 
achieved theoretical saturation described by scholars (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009; 
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Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  At a macro level, the theory evolved 
and directed my attention to the scope of matters, whilst at a micro level; theoretically 
appropriate data being gathered formed the framework for data collection (Breckenridge 
& Jones, 2009; Suddaby, 2006).   
 Concepts which were similar were grouped together into categories.  I clustered 
the concepts into categorical silos of similar meaning that better explained the 
phenomena observed within the dataset on the cases (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Eisenhardt, 
1989b; Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  My goal in using a grounded theory approach to data 
analysis was two-fold: first, analysis while still collecting data expedited the theoretical 
saturation process; and second, I was able to be reactive in data collection methods in 
order to accommodate any newly emergent themes not already captured within the 
dataset (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009; Eisenhardt, 1989b).  In the late stages of data 
analysis component of this thesis, I leveraged the gift of hindsight and arranged the 
dataset into chronological order to determine if any causal events presented themselves as 
suggested by Eisenhardt (1989b) and Maxwell (1996). 
 I used an inductive bottom-up approach to developing theory as was outlined 
earlier.  I employed the use of coding (open, axial and selective) and memos (which will 
be described more fully in the next section).  A theoretical framework emerged as a direct 
result of using a multi-case study with a grounded theory approach to data analysis, rather 
than approaching the data with a theoretical framework in mind to be tested.  Because I 
deferred the development of a theoretical framework initially, the data from the different 
cases determined the resulting framework and initial biases were mitigated as much as 
possible.  Eisenhardt (1989b) developed a process for theory development in the context 
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of a case study; Table 1. Case Study Theory Development Process Adapted from 
Eisenhardt (1989b) offers specific details of the theory development I used as this thesis 
unfolded. 
Table 1. Case Study Theory Development Process Adapted from Eisenhardt (1989b) 
Stage	   Activity	   Rationale	  
Project	  launch	  
 Develop	  research	  questions	  
	  
 No	  theory	  or	  hypothesis	  
 Decide	  upon	  cases	  to	  employ	  
	  
	  
 Theoretical	  sampling	  	  
 Focuses	  paper	  and	  
researcher	  efforts	  
 Allows	  theoretical	  flexibility	  
 Allows	  researcher	  to	  
mitigate	  outside	  variation	  by	  
choosing	  specific	  cases	  
 Focuses	  on	  cases	  useful	  to	  
theory	  generation	  
Data	  collection	    Multiple	  data	  collection	  
methods	  
 Overlapping	  of	  data	  
collection	  and	  analysis	  
	  
 Flexible	  data	  collection	  	  
 Strengthens	  grounding	  of	  
theory	  by	  triangulation	  of	  
evidence	  
 Expedites	  analyses	  and	  
reveals	  potential	  
adjustments	  to	  data	  
collection	  
 Allows	  researcher	  to	  utilize	  
emergent	  themes	  &	  unique	  
case	  themes	  
Data	  analysis	    Within-­‐case	  analysis	  
	  
 Cross-­‐case	  pattern	  search	  
	  
	  
 Shaping	  hypothesis	  
 Familiarizes	  the	  researcher	  
with	  data	  set	  and	  initial	  
theory	  genesis	  
 Creates	  conditions	  where	  
researcher	  must	  look	  for	  
unifying	  themes	  
 Explore	  causation	  in	  
relationships	  which	  leads	  to	  
internal	  validity	  
 Replication	  across	  cases	  
confirms	  and	  focuses	  
theory.	  
Closure	    Comparison	  to	  similar	  
literature	  
 Reaching	  closure	  
 Builds	  internal	  validity	  and	  
broadens	  generalizability	  
 Theoretical	  saturation	  when	  
only	  small	  gains	  are	  being	  
made	  on	  theory.	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Coding and Memos 
 Traditional parameters of coding were followed in a grounded theory approach, 
namely: open, axial and selective (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  
Open coding refers to the breaking up of events into smaller, more elementary 
components then labelling the phenomena described; this phase formed the building 
blocks for the budding theory.  Axial coding refers to the grouping of the elementary 
concepts into more abstract categories and subcategories.  Lastly, the selective coding 
phase of this study incorporated the newly identified categories and how they relate to a 
core category; these relationships then formed the framework for the emergent theory 
(Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1987).   
 I analyzed each article, sentence by sentence, paragraph by paragraph throughout 
the open coding phase; it was in this phase that concepts arose in the article on a case that 
could be compared to the other cases, those concepts were then labelled and described 
throughout this phase of research.  Once all the emerging concepts were labelled within 
the dataset, I then moved into the axial coding phase where I grouped the results of the 
open coding into silos of common meaning.  I used the following silos of meaning: causal 
conditions (the factors that influenced the events), the context of condition (to understand 
generalized conditions), stakeholder mobilization stratagems (actions undertaken by 
stakeholders, the motivators for those actions and the immediate results of those actions), 
and the consequences (Corbin & Strauss, 1990).   
 Once the core category was identified, I then determined and described the 
relationships of the categories to the core category; this was my first foray into the 
selective coding process.  I developed a sequential matrix illustrating the environment 
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and results of the relationships between the concepts and emerging categories which 
formed the basis for my proposed theory.  I employed my own contemporaneous journal 
writings on the events as a source material as it contained intimate descriptions of events 
in a chronological order as events were unfolding in the Road2Gold case.  Any bias 
arising from analyzing my own diary as a piece of secondary source material was 
tempered primarily because the diary was started in August 2009, on the advice of my 
lawyer, before I was even a student and the vast majority of the writings occurred when 
my preliminary thesis research was focused on a completely different topic.   
 Because of the nature of this study3, it would have been impossible to capture all 
emergent categories, qualities, hypotheses and developing questions that evolved from 
the analytic process.  There had to be a system in place for tracking and confirming 
findings, so I followed protocol suggested by Strauss and Corbin (1998) to engage in 
memoing.  Memos were used to track ideas which developed when comparing situations 
and concepts throughout the grounded theory approach to data analysis.  Ideas that 
developed and comparisons between concepts were noted in the articles and captured in 
memos. 
Reliability and Validity 
Establishing the validity within this proposed thesis study, a number of strategies 
were undertaken.  To address construct validity, clear operational processes were 
implemented for coding and memoing.  Limiting the article search to certain keywords, 
namely; ‘Madoff’, ‘Earl Jones’, ‘Ponzi scheme’ and ‘fraud’ ensured the articles were on 
                                                
3 I am ,of course, referring here to the extreme number of victims of Ponzi schemes and other types of 
corporate fraud, as well as the voluminous amount written (and still being written) on the cases of Madoff 
and Jones. 
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point and limited to the focal area, namely cases pertaining to corporate fraud, Madoff 
and Jones.  As Corbin noted, “the generalizability of a grounded theory is partly achieved 
through a process of abstraction that takes place over the entire course of the research.  
The more abstract the concepts... the wider the theory’s applicability” (1990, p. 15).  In 
simpler terms, because the theory is grounded in the data, it is constrained to the 
situations it is based upon; however, parallel events or situations can lend themselves to 
more extensive testing of theories in subsequent studies.   The theoretical model and 
research questions generated by the findings may be tested and explored at a later date.  
The theory offered by this study is broad enough to reproduce by others wishing to 
further this stream of research.  
By the very nature of using a grounded theory approach to data analysis, it is very 
difficult to ensure reliability in the traditional sense.  Reliability seeks to ensure 
consistent measurements in a study; however, grounded theory’s goal is creation of new 
theory so reliability is not necessarily applicable.  As Yin notes, “every case study project 
should strive to develop a formal, retrievable database, so... other investigators can 
review the evidence directly and not be limited to the written reports...” (2003, pp. 98 - 
99).  I have created a database of records used and scanned accompanying coding and 
memos to ensure transparency, and thus increase the trustworthiness, in my method.   As 
Stenbacka (2001) suggests, since reliability is focused primarily on measurements, it 
could then be argued that it has no place in qualitative research.  Instead, quality, rigor 
and trustworthiness have been offered up as more robust ways of differentiating good 
qualitative research from bad (Davies & Dodd, 2002; Stenbacka, 2001).  To ensure the 
rigorousness of my thesis, I shared articles and coding scheme with graduate student 
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peers where we compared findings to ensure the transparency of method and trustworthy 
and dependability of findings; furthermore, I shared articles, coding and scanned notes 
online that have already been completed by me those same graduate student peers, to 
validate findings and ensure reliability through triangulation and generation of an audit 
trail. 
Coding Transitions 
 After the initial pool of articles was obtained, I read through the articles without 
initially coding or memoing to familiarize myself with the article content.  Once the 
initial read-through was completed, I then immediately re-read the article; only this time I 
was highlighting passages that seemed important to me while noting ideas that emerged 
while reading the text.  As my analysis progressed, I noted that certain categories 
naturally seemed to group together (i.e. demographic information and stakeholder 
leadership), while other categories were more elusive in how they were interconnected at 
a more macro level.  Table 2 shows the breakdown of occurrences of the various themes 
and how they were coded during the open coding phase and how they were subsequently 
clustered into silos as I transitioned to the axial coding phase of this study. 
For example, Anne Sutherland’s (2009b) article, “’He’s not a thief, he’s Satan’: 
alleged Earl Jones victims” had demographic information (i.e. median age of 65, 
‘affluent’ Quebecers, etc.) which easily formed into a tight silo during the axial phase of 
analysis; however, the article also had categories which dealt with legal matters, the 
named committee and its spokesperson.  As I moved from open to axial coding, the 
elements of stakeholder leadership were being mentioned increasingly alongside one 
another.  For example, Table 2 shows stakeholder leadership having the open portion 
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elements mentioned 17, 16, 15, 12 times respectively out of 32 articles and interviews 
examined.  I coded the open category elements together into the stakeholder leadership 
silo (i.e. spokesperson named, group named, more than one stakeholder group 
mentioned) as it became apparent that they were related and interconnected with one 
another to describe the group organization.   
 Since I was a stakeholder affected by a fraud; my own biases clearly affected my 
coding.  I was, for instance, keenly aware in the Road2Gold case being stalled because of 
the lack of other leaders willing to assist in moving the group in a direction; alternately, 
in the Jones case, I came to admire the leadership committee for the accomplishments 
they have won in the wake of the Jones affair.  Moreover, without a lawyer to assist in 
navigating the legal system in the Road2Gold case, the movement seemed to stall for 
long periods while I gathered the required legal knowledge to make an informed decision 
on the next course of action; whereas, in the Jones case, Neil Stein is mentioned 
repeatedly speaking for, and obviously counselling investors on the best next legal steps.  
My interests may have guided the development of categories; however, my bias should 
not diminish or detract from my findings given that the point of a grounded theory 
approach is to describe phenomena and offer potential new theory to the body of 
knowledge.   
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Table 2: Open and Axial Categories Theme Counts 
Earl	  Jones	   Bernie	  Madoff	  	  Axial	  Coding	  
Silo	  
Open	  Coding	  
Categories	   Articles	  (n	  =	  32)	   Articles	  (n	  =	  45)	  
Age	   16	   12	  
Socio-­‐economic	  
status	  
11	   15	  
Number	  of	  victims	   16	   21	  
Demographics	  
of	  victims	  
Amount	  invested	   18	   23	  
Geographic	  location	  
of	  stakeholders	  
22	   18	  
Personal	  relationship	  
with	  fraudster	  
13	   16	  
Proximity	  of	  
victim	  to	  
fraudster	  
Nature	  of	  relationship	  
with	  fraudster	  
18	   26	  
Victim’s	  attitude	  
towards	  fraudster	  
15	   19	  Pre-­‐crisis	  
attitude	  of	  
victims	   Feelings	  about	  past	  
situation	  
12	   16	  
Victim’s	  attitude	  
towards	  fraudster	  
15	   19	  Post-­‐crisis	  
attitude	  of	  
victims	   Feelings	  about	  
current	  situation	  
21	   11	  
Regulatory	  
investigation	  
6	   11	  Legal	  
involvement	  
pre-­‐	  crisis	   Lawsuit	  against	  
fraudster	  
5	   3	  
Authorities	  reaction	  
to	  fraud	  
11	   25	  
Regulatory	  reaction	   7	   12	  
Legal	  
involvement	  
post-­‐crisis	  
Political	  reaction	   6	   3	  
Spokesperson	   17	   9	  
Lawyer	  mentioned	   16	   27	  
Group	  named	   15	   6	  
Stakeholder	  
leadership	  
#	  of	  victim	  groups	   12	   26	  
Cohesion	  of	  group	   19	   3	  Overall	  
stakeholder	  
cohesiveness	  
Different	  agendas	   12	   20	  
Goals	  of	  stakeholders	   21	   23	  Tactical	  goal	  
Nonmonetary	  goals	   17	   9	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Case Analysis 
 The three cases that were chosen offered an interesting juxtaposition of victim 
characteristics.  This section will provide an overview of the three cases studied for this 
thesis.  Each case will present the: background of the perpetrator, nature of the fraud, 
description of the victim demographic, the regulatory response, the victims’ response 
upon learning of the fraud, and the current state of the stakeholder group. 
Bernard ‘Bernie’ Madoff 
 Bernard ‘Bernie’ Madoff, before his downfall, was one of the most well respected 
wealth managers in the world (Bandler & Varchaver, 2009; Lieberman, Gogoi, Howard, 
McCoy, & Krantz, 2008).  Madoff created Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC 
which started as a penny stock and competed with other traders at the New York Stock 
Exchange (Anonymous, 2009a; Nasaw, 2011); Madoff helped develop the stock trading 
software that would eventually become basis for the NASDAQ stock market (de la 
Merced, 2008).  Rather than invest client money in the market to generate returns, 
Madoff would take the investment capital and deposit it into a JPMorgan Chase bank 
account (Stempel, 2010).  When clients expected their returns, or requested their capital 
back, Madoff would withdraw from the JPMorgan Chase bank account, thus creating the 
illusion of propriety for investors (Stempel, 2010; Zweig, 2008).  
Madoff’s case involved a great many people (n=1000s) from the middle and 
upper socioeconomic classes (Anonymous, 2009b; Kane, 2008; Lewis, 2011; Zweig, 
2008).  Madoff’s victims’ losses (with the fabricated gains factored in) were nearly $65 
billion USD in the largest Ponzi scheme in American history (Farrell & Masters, 2009; 
Lucchetti & Lauricella, 2009).  According to Madoff, his victims were motivated 
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primarily by greed to give him their money with little due diligence done investigating 
Madoff; the victims were blinded by the large, steady returns Madoff had delivered for 
over 20 years to other investors (Bandler & Varchaver, 2009; Kane, 2008; Singletary, 
2011).  When asked, the majority of victims interviewed said that in retrospect, they did 
not engage in enough due diligence and were blinded to the risks of investment by the 
high rates of return on investment (Bandler & Varchaver, 2009; Brockman, 2009; Lewis, 
2011; Zweig, 2008).  Major Wall Street companies suspected that Madoff’s returns were 
illegitimate and chose not to do business with Madoff (Davis, 2010; Lucchetti & 
Lauricella, 2009; Zweig, 2008).  
There were clear warning signs pointing towards the Ponzi scheme Madoff 
engaged in.  In 1999, Madoff’s wealth management competitors contracted an expert 
(Harry Markopolos) to investigate Madoffs unprecedented (and consistent) returns of 1-
2% per month for 20 years (CBS News, 2009; Vlessing, 2011).  Once the model was 
investigated and revenue streams analyzed, Markopolos concluded that there was no legal 
way for Madoff to have been investing money seeing growth at a nearly perfect 45 
degree upward curve.  Markopolos then submitted a complaint to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2000 detailing his concerns with Madoff’s hedge fund 
(CBS News, 2009); Markopolos would then go on to submit 3 other detailed complaints 
about Madoff and the impossible returns he was offering, all to no avail.  The SEC, 
despite investigating in 2003 and again in 2007 failed to uncover obvious indicators of 
the fraud being committed (Farrell, 2009; Moyer, 2008; Weil, 2008).  It was not until 2 
clients attempted to withdraw accounts (totalling $7 billion USD) that the Ponzi finally 
collapsed upon itself as Madoff did not have enough liquidity in the JPMorgan Chase 
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bank account to cover those withdrawals (Fishman, 2011; Stempel, 2010; Vlessing, 
2011).  
 Investors have opted primarily for litigious tactics in dealing with the fraud 
perpetrated upon them by Madoff.  Investors have sued the estate of Madoff himself 
(Bosman, 2011; Cassady, 2011), the SEC (Farrell, 2009), the bank Madoff used in 
conducting his business (Juan, 2009; Stempel, 2010), and each other (Klasfeld, 2011; 
Stempel, 2011).  There is little group cohesion amongst the Madoff victims; the victims 
of the Madoff Ponzi scheme formed multiple, smaller stakeholder groups instead of one 
massive group.  Multiple firms of lawyers acting on behalf of multiple stakeholder groups 
targeted one another in order to secure what they can of Madoff’s forfeited assets 
(Klasfeld, 2011; Singletary, 2011; Stempel, 2011).  Existing relationships between 
Madoff’s victims’ were present through their country clubs, familial units, investing 
clubs, etc. (Brockman, 2009; Chung, 2009; Kane, 2008; Lewis, 2011; Lieberman et al., 
2008); however, because the pool of investors was so great and so widely disbursed, there 
was little cohesion amongst the cluster of stakeholder groups (Klasfeld, 2011; Stempel, 
2011).  This may be due to the fact that in the broad sense the victims had little in the 
way of personal relationships built with one another prior to this fraud being exposed. 
 Bernie Madoff pled guilty to 11 counts of securities fraud and money laundering 
for which he received a sentence of 150 years in prison (Searcey, 2009). Madoff, despite 
being the mastermind behind the massive fraud, is not alone in facing justice; the former 
Chief Financial Officer, Frank DiPascali, has pled guilty to 10 criminal charges ranging 
from conspiracy to securities fraud in exchange for his assistance and testimony against 
Madoff, and could face up to 125 years in jail if given the maximum sentence (Healy & 
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Henriques, 2009).  DiPascali is still awaiting sentencing by the courts as of this writing.  
The accounting firm which did all of the work for Madoff’s financial empire was a major 
clue something was amiss if any due diligence was done:  the accounting firm had 
exactly one active chartered accountant working for it and was not peer reviewed to 
ensure proper accounting rules were followed (Roybark, 2009).  The accountant who 
supposedly audited Madoff’s empire, David G. Friehling, has pled guilty to filing false 
audit reports to the SEC, aiding and abetting fraud, and securities fraud in exchange for 
helping prosecutors with the Madoff case (Hamblett, 2009).  If given the maximum 
sentence, Friehling could face up to 114 years in prison (Hamblett, 2009); however, the 
courts will not sentence Friehling until March, 2012 (Pavlo, 2011).    
 Madoff’s assets were seized and sold off to compensate victims (de la Merced, 
2009); as well estates of deceased beneficiaries of Madoff’s scheme have contributed 
restitution to some victims (Stempel, 2011).  Because there are restitution funds 
available, unfortunately, a situation has been created where stakeholders are left fighting 
amongst themselves to recover lost capital (Klasfeld, 2011; Stempel, 2011).  
Earl Jones 
 Earl Jones operated as an investment advisor in the Montreal area from 1979 to 
2009 (Patriquin, 2009).  Jones handled everything for his clients: bill payments, securing 
mortgages, taxes, managing trust accounts and traditional investing opportunities (CBC, 
2010; Ha & Perreaux, 2009; Sutherland, 2009a, 2010d).  Earl Jones, despite not being a 
registered investment advisor, operated the Earl Jones Consultant and Administration 
Corporation (with listings in the phone book as a financial planner) for nearly 20 years 
(CBC, 2010; Friday, 2009; Sutherland, 2010e).  Earl Jones’ investors would give Jones 
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investment capital or estates to manage and would see regular returns on their 
investments paid out at approximately 8% per annum (Patriquin, 2009; Sutherland, 
2009a, 2010e).  Jones used Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) cheques for his commercial 
(and later personal) account with ‘In Trust’ written upon them creating the illusion that 
the account was an actual trust account, when in fact it was not (Ha, 2010; RBC knew, 
2010; Watson, 2010).  However, instead of investing the money, Jones would deposit the 
incoming money to his ‘trust’ account and pay out returns from the banked principal 
(CBC, 2010; Friday, 2009; Ha, 2010; Sutherland, 2010c).   
The Earl Jones case involved a relatively small number of victims (n=158) that 
suffered a combined loss of approximately $50 million CAD (CBC, 2010; Ha & 
Perreaux, 2009).  The majority of the victims were either directly related to Jones or part 
family of friends invested with Jones (Anonymous, 2010b, 2010d; Friday, 2009; Ha & 
Perreaux, 2009).  Jones relied mostly on his own network of friends and family as a 
source of victims for his fraud (Patriquin, 2009; Watson, 2010).  In the later stages of his 
Ponzi, Jones’ fraud extended beyond his own family and friends; Jones targeted terminal 
and elderly patients in retirement homes, charmed the victims into modifying their last 
will and testament, then schedule a probate case and establish himself as executor of the 
will after the death of the client and gain access to their estate (Friday, 2009; Ha & 
Perreaux, 2009). 
The victims of the Jones scheme shared a few common demographic elements: 
first, they were elderly and for the most part wealthy (Patriquin, 2009; Sutherland, 2009b, 
2010c); second, they all were living (or invested through someone living) within the 
province of Quebec at the time of the initial investment (Anonymous, 2010c; CBC, 2010; 
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Sutherland, 2009a, 2010e); and third, the vast majority of victims personally knew, or 
were related to Earl Jones (Anonymous, 2010b; Davidson, 2009; Patriquin, 2009; 
Sutherland, 2010b).  Trust in Earl Jones was the single most common reason given by 
victims for choosing to invest their money with him (Patriquin, 2009; Sutherland, 2009b, 
2010b).  There were no outward warning signs that this was a Ponzi scheme; however, 
some stakeholders contend that Jones’ bank had to have known something was amiss 
(Ha, 2010; Sutherland, 2010c).  Once the Ponzi scheme collapsed upon itself (due to less 
new money coming in to be invested), the victims, almost universally, expressed the 
same range of emotions in interviews: anger at the situation and having their trust broken, 
embarrassment of being caught in a Ponzi scheme, and fear of what will become of them 
after suffering a (in some cases) huge financial loss4.   
Once Jones was arrested, the case moved quickly through the legal system 
culminating in Earl Jones pleading guilty to the Crown’s charges (Malfara, 2010; Peritz, 
2010).  Earl Jones received an 11 year sentence and under Canadian law would be 
eligible for parole after serving 1/6 of his sentence5 (Peritz, 2010; Sutherland, 2009a; 
Woodhouse, 2009a).  Despite failing to catch the Ponzi scheme Jones was running, the 
Province of Quebec has been hesitant to strengthen its regulatory framework 
(Anonymous, 2010a, 2010d, 2011; Macpherson, 2009).   
 The victims of Earl Jones mobilized quickly into action and formed a cohesive 
stakeholder group; the group even named themselves the Earl Jones Victim Group 
(EJVG) (Anonymous, 2010b; Martin, 2009).  The EJVG initially pursued justice in the 
                                                
4 Some victims have lost their entire life savings, their homes, retirement funds all gone because they 
trusted Earl Jones with their money. 
5 This is because of the non-violent nature of the crimes. 
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form of assisting investigators by providing documentation and statements, later they 
targeted the RBC also being culpable in Jones’ crimes (Ha, 2010; Watson, 2010).  EJVG 
targeted RBC because they felt that reasonable care was not undertaken by the bank.   
The RBC was aware of Jones using ‘In Trust’ on the cheques issued to him by RBC to 
create the impression of a trust account on their cheques five years before the Ponzi 
scheme failed, yet did nothing to investigate; now RBC is in court being sued by the 
EJVG for their lack of oversight (Ha, 2010; Watson, 2010).  Moreover, the EJVG is now 
engaged in political action attempting to raise awareness of white collar crimes in the lax 
Canadian legal system (Anonymous, 2010d; Macpherson, 2009; Woodhouse, 2009a, 
2009b); they are advocating for stiffer penalties, easement of tax burdens paid on non-
existent capital gains and increasing the awareness amongst regulators.  As well, some of 
the victim stakeholders have launched independent lawsuits targeting non-bank entities 
that facilitated Jones (Sutherland, 2010d). 
 There are a few factors which have led to tight group cohesion with the EJVG.  
First, Jones victims, for the most part, were targeted because of their relationship with 
Jones; that relationship translated into increased trust in Jones and most victims felt that 
they did not need to engage in much due diligence.  Second, the EJVG enlisted a single 
lawyer to act as a spokesman for the group.  Virtually none of the $50 million CAD was 
recovered; however, some money has been refunded by insurance companies 
(Sutherland, 2010a) and taxes paid on non-existent proceeds (Sutherland, 2011b). 
Road2Gold 
This is a recent Canadian case where investors were led to believe they were 
buying designated lots of raw ore (that allegedly contained gold at an assay of 0.1 ounce 
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per ton) and were told that the ore was not technically a security; the transaction was 
described to investors as mercantile in its nature and thus immune from the jurisdiction of 
securities commissions and their regulations for accredited purchasers (McCormick, 
2010).  World markets were already in free fall when this opportunity was presented to 
investors, and gold was an alluring investment option6.  Road2Gold’s business was built 
upon an electronic purchase portal model that would connect the purchasers and 
processors, the founder even went so far as to patent the business model.  In this case, 
‘mercantile’ was part of the scam as it was part of the sales process wherein the 
transaction was likened to a retail transaction rather than a paper trade in commodities 
(and thus more heavily regulated) (McCormick, 2009, 2010).  Investors would, 
supposedly, purchase raw ore which would then be sent for processing, once processed, 
the gold would be sold to third party investors, profits would be then sent out and 
repurchase of original principal would be repeated if so desired (McCormick, 2010; 
Road2Gold, 2009).  Because the investment was (supposedly) mercantile it was allegedly 
guaranteed against loss, as the company had proven assays, the land lease (the offering 
company would keep any other precious minerals resulting from processing) and the 
liquidated capital assets were alleged to  more than guarantee investor’s capital 
(McCormick, 2009).  As part of the sales pitch to investors, the raw tailings purchase was 
likened to buying a toaster: if the customer was not happy with their toaster (ore tailings) 
they could return it for the original purchase price with no questions asked.  The reality 
was that there were never rights secured for the ore itself (Doe, 2009)7, yet initial 
                                                
6 When this investment was presented in the early summer of 2009 to customers, gold was trading at 
approximately $900 per ounce (McCormick, 2009).  As of September 26, 2011 gold is trading at 
approximately $1600 per ounce, nearly doubling in value in two years.  
7 The name of the email sender has been changed to preserve confidentiality. 
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investors were paid out processing proceeds (McCormick, 2009, 2010).  New investors 
were injecting funding that was rerouted to original investors; a classic case of Ponzi 
scheme.   
In April 2009, Road2Gold sent out an email update to investors, rather than ‘blind 
carbon-copying’ the email group, the email was sent out with all investors carbon-copied 
(Road2Gold, 2010).  This mistake, on the part of the firm, allowed investors to 
communicate with one another and mobilize towards recouping their lost investments.  
The Road2Gold case involves people (n=300) spread across North America, with the 
majority of victims concentrated in Western Canada (McCormick, 2009).  The majority 
of investors committed less than $50,000 CAD each to the endeavour, yet to some of the 
stakeholders it represents a massive financial commitment (McCormick, 2009, 2010). 
Because there is no central Securities and Exchange Commission, British 
Columbia, Alberta and Ontario’s commissions have each been alerted to the workings of 
Road2Gold; however, because Road2Gold was incorporated in the United States (US), 
the ore bought originated in the US, and money transferred to the US, jurisdiction and 
enforcement has become a challenge (McCormick, 2009).  The RCMP was alerted in 
2010 about this case; however, nothing has been done by them beyond initial 
investigation of the documentation and preliminary statements from group leadership 
members (McCormick, 2009).  The Federal Bureau of Investigation and American SEC 
have also been alerted; however, as of this writing little has been done to rectify the 
situation (McCormick, 2009). 
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Group leadership in the Road2Gold case is composed of a few people widely 
spaced geographically who meet irregularly via Skype.  There are lawyers who were 
caught in this Ponzi scheme (McCormick, 2009); however, they do not wish to be part of 
the leadership and have taken a more passive role within the group.  The group has an 
email list to keep all stakeholders within the group updated; however, few stakeholders 
respond to questions, or calls to contact the authorities. 
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Emergent Categories 
The selective coding phase of data analysis generated the categories used in Table 
2.  The categories include: 
• Demographics of victims; 
• Proximity of victim to fraudster; 
• Pre-crisis attitude of victims; 
• Post-crisis attitude of victims; 
• Legal involvement pre-crisis; 
• Speed of legal enforcement post-crisis; 
• Stakeholder leadership; 
• Overall stakeholder cohesion; 
• Tactical goals. 
It was these categories which formed the basis for the framework for theory 
described in the next section. 
Table 3: Matrix of Commonality amongst Cases 
	  
Bernie	  Madoff	   Earl	  Jones	   Road2Gold	  
Demographics	  
of	  victims	  
Middle	  to	  upper	  
socioeconomic	  class;	  
thousands	  of	  victims	  
widely	  disbursed	  
Upper	  class;	  158	  total	  
victims	  contained	  within	  
the	  Province	  of	  Quebec	  
Lower	  to	  upper	  
socioeconomic	  class;	  
hundreds	  of	  victims	  
mostly	  in	  Western	  
Canada	  
Proximity	  of	  
victim	  to	  
fraudster	  
Many	  middle	  men	  
between	  fraudster	  and	  
victims	  
Personal	  relationship	  
with	  fraudster;	  sought	  
investments	  from	  family	  
and	  friends	  
A	  few	  middle	  men	  
between	  fraudster	  and	  
victims	  
Pre-­‐crisis	  
attitude	  of	  
victims	  
Sought	  higher	  than	  
standard	  returns;	  
trusted	  reputation	  
Sought	  secured	  
investments;	  steady	  
returns;	  personal	  trust	  
in	  perpetrator	  	  
Sought	  secured	  
investments;	  steady	  
returns,	  personal	  trust	  
in	  brokers	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Bernie	  Madoff	   Earl	  Jones	   Road2Gold	  
Post-­‐crisis	  
attitude	  of	  
victims	  
Anger,	  
embarrassment,	  
financially	  hurt,	  
determined	  to	  have	  
restitution	  and	  punish	  
perpetrator	  	  
Anger,	  embarrassment,	  
financial	  devastation,	  
determined	  to	  punish	  
perpetrator,	  wanted	  to	  
change	  regulations	  
Anger,	  embarrassment,	  
financially	  hurt,	  
determined	  to	  have	  
restitution	  and	  punish	  
perpetrator	  
Legal	  
involvement	  
pre-­‐	  crisis	  
16	  years	  of	  complaints	  
to	  SEC	  (with	  6	  
substantive	  
complaints);	  missed	  
warning	  signs;	  minimal	  
investigation	  
Initial	  complaints	  
triggered	  investigation	  
and	  conviction	  
Securities	  investigations	  
(three	  different	  
provinces:	  AB,	  MB,	  
ON8);	  cease	  trade	  
orders	  issued	  in	  British	  
Columbia	  	  
Speed	  of	  legal	  
enforcement	  
post-­‐crisis	  
Expedient	  once	  fraud	  
revealed;	  150	  year	  
sentence;	  no	  chance	  of	  
parole	  
Expedited	  once	  the	  
scheme	  was	  revealed;	  
sentenced	  to	  11	  years;	  
eligible	  for	  parole	  after	  
22	  months	  (December	  
2011)	  
Extremely	  slow;	  RCMP	  
deciding	  whether	  to	  
fully	  investigate	  
(January	  2011	  –	  
present)	  
Stakeholder	  
leadership	  
No	  single	  voice	  
amongst	  fractious	  
groups;	  multiple	  
lawyer	  
Individual	  spokesman	  
for	  group;	  committee	  
leadership;	  single	  
lawyer	  advocate	  for	  
group	  
Multiple	  spokesmen	  for	  
group;	  committee	  
leadership;	  multiple	  
lawyers	  involved	  (but	  
only	  in	  advising	  
capacity)	  
Overall	  
stakeholder	  
cohesiveness	  
Loose	  cohesion;	  
multiple	  groups;	  
focused	  on	  getting	  
money	  back.	  
Strong	  cohesion;	  single	  
group;	  moving	  beyond	  
legal	  fight	  into	  political	  
action	  
Loose	  cohesion;	  single	  
group;	  focused	  on	  
getting	  money	  back	  
Tactical	  goal	  
Secure	  as	  much	  lost	  
money	  as	  possible	  
from	  seized	  fraudster	  
assets;	  determine	  why	  
SEC	  did	  not	  heed	  
warning	  signs	  
Pursuing	  action	  against	  
fraudsters’	  bank,	  estate	  
and	  those	  who	  aided	  in	  
the	  fraud;	  political	  
actions	  to	  change	  
sentencing	  laws	  for	  
white-­‐collar	  crimes	  
Secure	  lost	  capital;	  see	  
that	  fraudster	  is	  
punished	  
Framework for Theory 
 Upon reviewing the three cases, the initial research questions can be revisited 
within the theoretical framework that emerged from the study.  The three overarching 
                                                
8 AB, MB, ON are the abbreviations of Alberta, Manitoba and Ontario respectively. 
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questions primarily focused on victims’ perceptions of themselves as members of a 
stakeholder group, the source of leadership for stakeholders, and victim group 
mobilization.  The emergent theoretical framework captures each of these aspects.    
Member Perception  
 The self-perception of stakeholders as being part of a global group of victims 
varied greatly between the three cases.  The EJVG was the most cohesive of all three 
cases.  Those victims, for the most part, had previously existing close relationships with 
one another as they were related to, or friends with Earl Jones.  Moreover, the EJVG 
stakeholder group’s close geographical proximity to one another and relatively low 
population (they could easily fit in a large restaurant or small conference salon) made for 
a stronger identity within the group which seems to have led to increased cohesion for the 
group.  Conversely, the victims of Madoff are polarized: there are thousands of Madoff 
victims spread across North America and Europe.  In the Madoff case, the lack of 
relationships pre-Ponzi scheme limited victims’ identifying as being part of a group, 
which led to lower group cohesion.  In the Road2Gold case, there were cliques of people 
that had existing relationships prior to investing; however, they were definitely in the 
minority.  Thus the Road2Gold case falls roughly in the middle of the extremes of the 
Jones and Madoff cases. 
 Considering this emergent spectrum then, the theoretical framework for 
stakeholder perceptions is represented in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Theoretical framework for stakeholder group perceptions 
 Given this theoretical model, maximizing the individual stakeholder perception as 
being part of a unified group appears to be contingent on a few factors: first, close 
geographically to one another; second, a small number of stakeholders; and third, the 
existence of relationships that predate the fraud.  Additionally, the absence of restitution 
funds for the victims (or other monetary inducements) also appears to be positively 
correlated with the cohesiveness of the group identity.  In the Madoff case, once whatever 
assets available were seized and liquidated, there was a pool of approximately $7 billion 
USD available for victims; however, this pool of money quickly became a bone of 
contention and has sparked many legal challenges as to who gets what portion of the 
remaining funds.  In the case of Jones, there was simply no money left from his fund and 
all of his assets had already been either liquidated or heavily leveraged to continue the 
Ponzi.  The Jones case clearly had the strongest group identity, yet there was no 
restitution available.  It is my contention that removing monetary motivators for 
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stakeholders might lead to stronger stakeholder group identity, such as with the EJVG, 
which in turn would in turn lead to the creation of a cohesive social movement; by not 
making money the goal, stakeholders may be more willing to identify as being part of a 
whole group which would lead to increased cohesion.   In the case of Road2Gold, it is 
still unclear as to what assets are available to appease investors; moreover, Road2Gold’s 
assets are protected by the corporate veil, meaning that unless the corporate veil is lifted 
by the courts, the directors and shareholders are limited in their liability, thus if the 
corporation has no assets, there is nothing then to liquidate and return to investors. 
 Based upon the data, it would appear that group cohesion is tied to how strongly 
the individual stakeholder identifies a bond with the other stakeholders within the group.  
In the Madoff case, stakeholders were widely disbursed geographically, with little in the 
way of pre-existing relationships before the fraud was exposed.  The Madoff stakeholder 
group is continuing to fight for the scraps of his empire and thus might self-identify as 
victims but not necessarily as being part of a homogeneous group, this is evidenced by 
the presence of many lawsuits being filed against one another.  In the Jones case, the pool 
of stakeholders was relatively small, virtually all the stakeholders knew or were related to 
one another and Jones had virtually no assets left to divide amongst victims.  The EJVG 
has shifted their initial scope beyond seeing justice done, they now are moving towards 
advocacy for harsher penalties for white-collar crimes.  In the Road2Gold case, regular 
communications and stakeholders giving personal updates continue as the group seeks 
justice and restitution for the fraud committee against them. 
 Reluctance of stakeholders to identify as stakeholders coupled with the relatively 
low group cohesion in the Madoff and Road2Gold cases would seem to suggest that there 
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is less of an identity-based move towards action and more of an instrumentality-based 
mobilization towards action.  In the case of Madoff, the divergent multi-stakeholder 
group dynamic is anathema to building identity-based action because there is no pride in 
being a part of said group and thus little shared group identity (Farrell, 2009; Stempel, 
2011).  In the case of Road2Gold, there is virtually no bonding between stakeholders 
beyond discussing restitution from the firm: there is no pride in being a part of the group 
and there is no joy in undertaking justice in an uncooperative legal system (McCormick, 
2009).   
In opposition to Madoff and Road2Gold, the EJVG has demonstrated clear 
stakeholder identity-based mobilization.  In their pursuit of changing the legal system and 
holding the fraudster (and those who aided the fraudster) accountable (Watson, 2010; 
Woodhouse, 2009a), Jones’ victims have formed a cohesive unit that bond through 
shared stories and experiences, as well as support each other (Sutherland, 2009b, 2011a; 
Watson, 2010).  
Stakeholder Leadership 
  The second question asked in this thesis was how stakeholders moved towards 
collective action and how the group organized itself.  Because Ponzi schemes virtually 
always result in legal actions against the fraudster (either detected by authorities or 
collapsed because of a lack of new funds), his company and other culpable entities 
(banks, brokers, sales agents, and others with fiduciary duty of positive interest), the 
presence of a lawyer is definitely required in any stakeholder group.   In the Jones and 
Madoff cases, hired attorneys became de facto group leaders for two reasons: first, 
lawyers typically advise clients not to speak publically about the cases (as they did not 
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want stakeholders jeopardizing the resulting court cases); and second, those same lawyers 
would shepherd the case through the legal system so they would need to be involved in 
the research and planning of stakeholder legal actions.  In the Road2Gold case, there is 
no attorney spearheading the leadership which might explain the long time delays victims 
endure to see justice and restitution done (McCormick, 2009). 
 The factors that emerged from examining stakeholder leadership are illustrated in 
Figure 2.  A smaller population of victims, less fractious groups within the larger 
stakeholder collective, resulted in stronger group leadership.  Moreover, when there 
exists an opportunity to continue stakeholder relationships amongst themselves and direct 
group attention to non-court issues, leadership becomes further reinforced.  Lastly, strong 
legal representation as a part of the stakeholder leadership directed efforts more 
effectively towards stakeholder goals. 
 
Figure 2: Theoretical framework for stakeholder leadership 
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 Stakeholders’ mobilizing towards collective action, like any social movement, 
typically requires strong, effective leadership (Jones & Kriflik, 2006; López-Pérez, 2009; 
Pryke, 2005).  Individual stakeholders with no relationship amongst one another, widely 
disbursed (as in the Madoff and Road2Gold cases) tended towards infighting over the 
scraps of assets without strong leadership to manage divergent agendas and keep the 
group on task.  In the Jones case, a leadership committee was struck with legal 
representation present that held in-person meetings, managed message boards on the 
World Wide Web and explored other avenues of directing group energies beyond justice 
for the fraudster (Anonymous, 2010b; Sutherland, 2010c; Watson, 2010). 
Stakeholder Mobilization 
 The last research question asked how stakeholders mobilize and organize as a 
group.   Are stakeholders self-organizing, for example, or are outsiders organizing and 
directing them?  Gathering specific data on this question from publically available data 
was difficult; however, several factors did emerge from the data analysis portion of this 
study.  These three cases appear to have stakeholders mobilizing towards two goals.  The 
first goal is that the offender is punished and restitution is attained (if possible) for the 
victims; the second goal is changing the regulatory climate to catch corporate fraud 
earlier and ensure that a satisfactory level of punishment is imposed on the perpetrator(s), 
which is a boon for the stakeholders specifically, and society generally.  In the Jones 
case, the EJVG lobbied the government to assign longer sentences to white collar crimes, 
and to require the taxes paid by investors for fraudulent proceeds returned.  In the Madoff 
case, stakeholders pressed legislators as to why the SEC did not catch Madoff’s fraud 
during one of their many investigations.  
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 In the Madoff case, stakeholders primarily mobilized as a group in assisting 
authorities build their case against Madoff; however, the stakeholders tended to act 
individually (or in small, independent groups) after Madoff was processed in the justice 
system.  The Madoff group of victims were vocal in online forums and traditional media 
outlets, they launched lawsuits and applied regulatory pressure; however, a cohesive 
group was never created broadly amongst stakeholders.   
Alternately, in the Jones case, the small number of stakeholders had existing 
relationships binding them together prior to the fraud as well as strong group leadership 
with lawyers advising and helping direct group action for maximum effect.  The EJVG 
simply did not have funds to pursue, yet stayed together as a group, after Jones was 
processed in the Justice system, to lobby for stronger sentences and changes to the parole 
system. 
 Figure 3 shows the theoretical framework that emerged from the three cases.  
Within the framework, the extent to which stakeholders mobilized was dependent upon 
several factors: overall stakeholder cohesiveness (i.e., stakeholders’ perception and 
identifying as being a stakeholder and part of a single group from Figure 1), the relative 
strength of stakeholder group leadership (i.e., the theoretical framework offered in Figure 
2), and whether there were alternate issues that were important to the stakeholder group 
to act upon (i.e., social or political issues that could be acted upon).   
  
55 
 
 
Figure 3: Theoretical framework for stakeholder mobilization. 
 Generally speaking, stakeholders were more effective at mobilization when the 
group: was smaller; had a strong centralized group leadership; and, there were alternate 
issues for the stakeholders to pursue as a collective (such as increasing penalties for 
offenders or lobbying governments to return taxes paid on fictional proceeds).   
Stakeholder discord arose when close geographical proximity was absent, when the group 
leadership failed to achieve consensus amongst stakeholders within the group, when there 
was more than one victim group present, and when there were money and assets left over 
from the fraud.  Further, when there was money available, discord amongst stakeholders 
rose and stakeholder cohesion fell. 
 Figure 4 illustrates the factors that will increase group cohesion and movement 
towards mobilization versus the factors that will increase discord amongst the stakeholder 
cohort.   
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Figure 4: Increased stakeholder mobilization versus increased stakeholder discord.
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Discussion 
This study yielded a number of potential research questions from the analysis of 
the data.  It is my assertion that a valuable distinction can be drawn in stakeholder 
research between stakeholder types: reluctant stakeholders and engaged stakeholders.   
Reluctant stakeholders, in my view, would be those people that have had an 
unforeseen and unwelcomed event thrust upon them (i.e. their investment capital 
misappropriated, water source fouled, etc.).  The reluctant stakeholder cohort might not 
be interested in identity-based mobilization beyond simply recovering what was lost or 
moving back towards as close to the baseline situation as possible, which suggests an 
instrumentality-based mobilization.  In the case of a community suddenly finding their 
water source fouled by industry operations, the community might mobilize to compel the 
enforcement of local environmental laws, and push for cleaning up of the water source.  
The reluctant stakeholders might be mobilizing towards activism and getting clean water 
sources for their community again, but they remain uninterested in other fights for clean 
water in distant geographical locations.   
The engaged stakeholder would mobilize alongside the reluctant stakeholder 
groups; however, engaged stakeholders are ready to take action beyond merely 
recovering what was lost.  It is my contention that engaged stakeholders are the cohort 
that do not just seek to recover what was lost, they seek to change their community and 
society through formulating social movements.  Emergent leadership might be able to 
rally stakeholders together into a unified group and shift perceptions from anger over 
what was lost into pride over the battle that could be  fought and changes that might be 
achieved  as a result.  In the case of a community’s fight over a contaminated water 
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source with industry, engaged stakeholders might seek to form networks with other 
communities, both locally and internationally, in an effort to change not only  the firm’s 
behaviour but to alter environmental laws.  
 The following series of research questions offer further avenues to pursue on this 
matter in order to determine if the relationships within the cases are indeed universal, or 
specific to these particular situations.  The generated questions, broadly, fall into three 
categories: identity of stakeholder groups, leadership of stakeholder groups, and 
mobilization of stakeholder groups. 
The Government as Stakeholder 
 Clearly, the government is a stakeholder when corporations behave badly; 
however, from the evidence in these cases the government is a reluctant stakeholder at 
best and an engaged stakeholder acting in the corporate interests at worst.  There are 
certainly agency problems that arise for regulators and lawmakers when corporate money 
(read: political donations) is considered free speech which leads to  situations that “stifle 
political speech by causing corporations to distance themselves from politically sensitive 
issues and candidates, and by creating administrative barriers to the efficient operation of 
the corporation” (Smith, 2011).  The line between corporate interests and elected officials 
is not just blurred; it is all but gone (Fang, 2011; Harris, 2011; Stathis, 2011).  The 
question then arises: what are individuals to do when the most powerful stakeholder (i.e. 
the government), is only willing to take only minimal action in combating white-collar 
crime?  This could lead to interesting research on business regulations and stakeholder 
reactions to those regulations. 
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R1:  How effective were business regulations in protecting stakeholder interests? 
There is a revolving door, particularly in the United States, of people shifting 
from the role of being a government regulator to working as a regulated industry lobbyist 
or vice versa (Martin, 2011), or worse, lawmakers simply selling access time directly to 
lobbyists (Fang, 2011).  This apparent corruption of safeguards for the commons might 
add to the malaise and hopelessness investors feel when caught in a fraud, and lessen the 
chance of stakeholders mobilizing (either reluctant or engaged) which leads to the 
subsequent research question. 
R2:  For stakeholders affected by fraud, to what extent does frustration with the 
legal system contribute to their mobilization towards action? 
 Recently, it has come to light that the SEC has been destroying records it was 
supposed to keep for 25 years (Gallu, 2011; Rothfeld & Strasburg, 2011; Tiabbi, 2011).  
The preliminary investigation records of thousands of cases have all been purged, 
contrary to the public interest, but greatly in favour of corporate interests.  In the case of 
Madoff, the government had ample warnings that something was amiss (Davis, 2009, 
2010; Moyer, 2008); however, the government as a stakeholder did not fulfil its duty to 
any meaningful degree before thousands were victimized (Tiabbi, 2011).  In the Madoff 
case, I would argue that the government was an engaged stakeholder working to further 
the narrow interests of the corporation.  Madoff himself was very generous with his 
political donations and access to lawmakers given his 20 year career (Zajac & Hook, 
2008).  The SEC knew something was wrong, yet destroyed preliminary evidence against 
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Madoff which might have helped subsequent investigations, despite a clear directive not 
to destroy such evidence (Davis, 2009; Gallu, 2011; Tiabbi, 2011).   
 In Canada, there is no national securities regulator which leaves provincial 
commissions to investigate internally and the RCMP to investigate white-collar crimes 
nationally.  Canadian lawmakers are considering sweeping omnibus crime bills, yet leave 
out increased punishments for coordinated white-collar crimes (Astaphan, 2011); 
moreover, if the Canadian government were a serious stakeholder in upholding its duty to 
prevent and investigate white-collar crimes it would not have slashed the RCMP budget 
by 15% since 2009 (Freeze, Curry, & Leblanc, 2011).  The reality is that the Canadian 
government is not tough on white-collar crime at all.  The RCMP is cutting back on its 
investigations into white-collar crime despite a rising number of cases and is largely 
ineffective in pursuit of justice (Freeze et al., 2011; Williams, 2008).  The Canadian court 
system is far too backlogged to be effective in any meaningful way (Foot, 2011; Tyler, 
2007).  With no real support from the most powerful stakeholder, namely the 
government, victims of corporate transgressions are left virtually powerless against 
corporate fraud despite having legitimate complaints.  
 As mentioned earlier in this thesis, there is very little research targeting corporate 
fraud, specifically Ponzi schemes. The literature on fraud that is available, mostly 
addresses internal accountancy and human resource controls.  Given the increasing 
prevalence of white-collar crime in North America, there is real value in studying and 
understanding stakeholder dynamics in the context of corporate fraud given the rates of 
occurrence.  Canada is a relatively small country in terms of population, yet is ranked 
seventh in the world for frequency of white-collar crime (United Nations, 2008), a 
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number that does not capture the cases that go either unreported or un-investigated 
(Freeze et al., 2011).  White-collar crime destroys people’s lives and often leaves the 
elderly utterly destitute.  White collar crime affects more people than violent crime does, 
but receives less attention from the RCMP, government regulators, or researchers.  
Victims deserve redress, the public deserves better protection. 
Further research by organizational researchers, such as that proposed here could 
contribute to improved solutions for monitoring and reducing corporate fraud.  With 
adequate investigative and judicial support, engaged stakeholders could be empowered to 
take significant action against those that perpetrate fraud on investors.   Public policy 
must address the development of consumer supports and protections to encourage 
investment opportunities without fear of intentional ruination by the firm.  Public policy 
and legislation need to be crafted and enforced, but more importantly these efforts must 
be properly funded and monitored in order to safeguard the public trust.  Business 
academics have an opportunity to understand the role of the affected stakeholders and 
how they may exert a positive influence in the broader effort to reduce corporate fraud 
and limit the potential damage of wayward corporate citizens.   
Identity of Stakeholder Groups 
 It remains unclear to what extent stakeholders affected by fraud identify as being 
part of a larger cohort.  Furthermore, the question of whether there is a difference 
between reluctant and engaged stakeholders self-identifying as being part of a larger 
group should be examined.  Further research into reluctant (or engaged) stakeholder 
group identity affected by corporate fraud could explore: 
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R3:  What are the differences between reluctant and engaged stakeholder cohorts 
in self-identifying as group members? 
R4:  Do common demographic factors play a role in determining whether 
stakeholders mobilize into action? 
 Pursuing these research questions would offer an opportunity to further explore, 
for example, the trichotomy of interest-based versus identity-based versus ideological-
based mobilization.  Stakeholder mobilization appears to be much more effective when 
an identity-based action is undertaken particularly with engaged stakeholders (e.g.  
EJVG).  Understanding the factors that shift the reluctant stakeholder group from interest 
to identity-based mobilization could be critical for stakeholders to become engaged 
beyond simply recovering the status quo.   The initial crisis (the fraud or wrong 
committed) appears to be the impetus towards action despite Rowley and Moldoveanu’s 
(2003) assertion that interest-based action is not a primary motivator.  However, my 
findings indicate that moving the reluctant stakeholder group towards identity-based 
engagement could create an enduring social movement of advocacy.  This would then 
support the Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) model.  Identity-based group action is at the 
heart of new social movement theory and could be further tested against the other 
dimensions of social movements (Klandermans, 2004), specifically, instrumentality and 
ideology-based motivators.    
Leadership of Stakeholder Groups 
 Further research into stakeholder group leadership facing corporate fraud or other 
impropriety could explore: 
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R5:  Does strong group leadership play a role in stakeholder mobilization 
efforts?  If it does play a role, what difference does group leadership make 
between reluctant and engaged stakeholder cohorts in mobilization efforts? 
Stakeholder leadership has the opportunity to manage a reluctant group’s 
perceptions, namely, shifting the humiliation and rage initially experienced into pride and 
well-being by achieving enduring and tangible results for engaged victims (i.e. seeing the 
fraudster incarcerated, protests that alter government policy, etc.).  Testing stakeholder 
mobilization against corporations behaving badly could potentially dovetail with 
charismatic authority literature since the success of stakeholder groups achieving their 
goals is seemingly dependent upon the strength of leadership.   A charismatic leader (or 
leaders) might be the catalyst in forging reluctant victims into social activists which sow 
the seeds of a new social movement composed of highly engaged stakeholders that act 
based upon identity, ideology and interest-based motivations.    
Mobilization of Stakeholder Groups 
Further research into mobilization of stakeholder groups facing corporate 
malfeasance could investigate: 
R6:  Does the perception of being part of a cohesive group increase the 
probability of stakeholder mobilization? 
R7:  How and when do reluctant and engaged stakeholders differ in their 
mobilization initiatives and strategies? 
 There exists a rare opportunity to connect social movement theory with 
stakeholder theory by understanding the internal dynamics of group behaviour mobilized 
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against businesses acting illegally.  The economic loss suffered by victims is the initial 
motivator for group action; however, as was seen in the Jones’ case, the group formed 
because of the initial grievance, despite resource mobilization theory suggesting a 
movement would not form.    In the Jones’ case, the EJVG moved from reluctant 
stakeholders into fully engaged stakeholders regularly lobby the Federal and Provincial 
governments and could be considered a social movement that are attracting others who 
seek to identify with the groups ideals and goals and express similar ideology.  The group 
moved towards political action and built the internal group infrastructure as it evolved 
suggesting that every stream of social movement theory has a part of the whole process, 
particularly so when considering the shift from reluctant to engaged group membership.    
 In the Road2Gold and Madoff cases, stakeholders for the most part did not 
mobilize towards any goal beyond recovering what was lost.  In Road2Gold specifically, 
the reluctant stakeholders did not become engaged stakeholders possibly due to the lack 
of charismatic leadership and lack of resources mobilized.   
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Conclusion 
 Current stakeholder literature has focused upon the development of models which 
describe the relationships between the company and stakeholders, with the underlying 
assumption being that the company is operating in good faith in their dealings with 
stakeholders.  However, in the instance of Ponzi schemes, those traditional assumptions 
simply cannot be made.  The models do not apply.  The characteristics which are 
assumed in the current body of stakeholder literature do not match the characteristics of 
stakeholders that are victimized by corporate malfeasance.  The majority of current 
literature on corporate fraud focuses upon human resource prevention and accounting 
tactics for detection of fraud; rather than any issues that stakeholders face when 
confronting corporate fraud.  The central issue within the three cases chosen illustrates 
how stakeholders identified themselves and mobilized in response to corporate fraud. 
 This thesis investigated and analyzed three cases of Ponzi scheme in order to 
determine: stakeholder’s perception of being part of a cohesive group; stakeholder 
leadership that emerged from within the group; and, factors that influence whether 
stakeholders mobilize in response to the corporate malfeasance.  As a result of this study, 
there appear to be a number of factors which influence each of the research questions 
initially asked.  These factors (or categories) were developed from a grounded theory 
approach to the data analysis using open, axial, and selective coding techniques which 
identified specific case elements, categories and themes which are common amongst the 
three cases.  As a result of this study, a theoretical framework which would predict how 
the identified characteristics in a case of corporate fraud would address the research 
questions has been developed.   
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 This thesis has added to the literature in a number of ways.  First, we draw the 
distinction between reluctant stakeholders and engaged stakeholders.  Reluctant 
stakeholders would appear to be motivated by interests and not take pride in self-
identifying as part of the group; reluctant stakeholders seek to only get back what was 
lost or taken from them.  Engaged stakeholders, on the other hand, see the situation as an 
opportunity to turn the mobilization into a movement which attracts others to the cause. 
Engaged stakeholders have identity, interest and ideological needs met by participating in 
group actions.  Second, the determinants for self-identifying as part of the group, and 
factors for group success are proposed to be tested in the future.  Lastly, highlighting the 
opportunity for cross-disciplinary research into stakeholder mobilization and victim 
group relationships would provide valuable insight for the public, NGOs, governments 
and corporations. 
 My thesis was limited in both scope and available resources.  Only two cases had 
publically available information in the form of articles, published interviews and weblogs 
available; whereas the third case’s source material came from my own journal and 
statements to law enforcement officials.  Clearly, a larger sample size of stakeholder 
groups affected by fraud is necessary; moreover, other stakeholder groups affected by 
corporate malfeasance beyond fraud should be examined as well to confirm my findings.  
The materials written on both Madoff and Jones have tended to focus on the perpetrator, 
rather than on stakeholder stories, thus interviews with actual victims in the future would 
definitely be of value.  Firsthand accounts of the victims’ stories gathered, coupled with 
an interview guide or questionnaire would address and further validate my findings.   
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 By their very nature, case studies using a grounded theory approach are specific to 
their cases and preliminary in their findings; however, it is my hope that this thesis will 
have relevance to other cases of stakeholder mobilization beyond the three cases used.  It 
is to that end that I have offered a series of research questions to be answered in 
subsequent research to validate my conclusions.  This thesis has shown that there is an 
opportunity to bridge sociological, political science and managerial studies to explain 
group movements against bad corporate citizens, particularly when a fraud has been 
committed.  Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) suggested that stakeholders take pride in 
identifying as being part of the group; stakeholders actively mobilizing as a group, 
assisting law enforcement and lobbying government for harsher penalties for fraudsters is 
definitely something to be proud of.  When social movement theory is considered along 
with Rowley and Moldoveanu’s (2003) model, enduring movements seem to have 
interest and ideological-based motivations in addition to identity-based motivations.   
Exploration of a social movement’s resource mobilization strategy in influencing 
firm behaviour in the context of Frooman’s (1999) resource dependent withholding 
strategies would be valuable in understanding which resources are truly necessary for 
successful mobilizations.  Exploration of emergent leadership in stakeholder groups from 
both a management perspective and sociological perspective might offer NGOs insight to 
strengthen their cause and increase their effectiveness at holding business and 
government accountable for their actions.  As well, further research into understanding 
the process transforming reluctant stakeholders into engaged stakeholders through 
appeals to identity and ideological-based motivators might bolster the ranks of activist 
organization membership.   Although this study was limited in its scope, it has identified 
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opportunities to further examine the categories identified and expand both stakeholder 
and social movement paradigms.   
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Indicators	  to	  monitor	  in	  article	   Does	  the	  article	  address:	  
Demographics	  of	  Victims	  
 Age?	  
 Socio-­‐economic	  status?	  
 Number	  of	  victims	  of	  fraud?	  
 Amount	  invested?	  
Proximity	  of	  victim	  to	  fraudster	  
 Geographic	  location	  of	  stakeholders?	  
 Was	  there	  a	  personal	  relationship	  to	  fraudster?	  	  
 If	  so,	  what	  was	  it?	  
 Nature	  of	  relationship	  to	  fraudster?	  
 If	  so,	  what	  was	  it?	  (Institutional	  investing,	  family,	  friend,	  
colleague,	  etc.)	  
Pre-­‐crisis	  attitude	  of	  victims	    Attitude	  of	  victims	  towards	  fraudster?	  
 Feelings	  about	  past	  situation?	  
Post-­‐crisis	  attitude	  of	  victims	    Attitude	  of	  victims	  towards	  fraudster?	  
 Feelings	  about	  current	  situation?	  
Legal	  involvement	  pre-­‐crisis	  
 Were	  there	  regulatory	  investigations	  prior	  to	  crisis?	  
 If	  so,	  what	  was	  the	  result?	  
 Were	  there	  lawsuits	  against	  the	  fraudster	  prior	  to	  crisis?	  
 If	  so,	  what	  was	  the	  result?	  
Legal	  involvement	  post-­‐crisis	  
 Authority’s	  reaction	  to	  fraud,	  if	  any?	  
 Regulatory	  (SEC,	  etc.)	  reaction	  to	  fraud,	  if	  any?	  
 Political	  reaction	  to	  fraud,	  if	  any?	  
Stakeholder	  leadership	  
 Is	  there	  a	  spokesperson	  named?	  
 Is	  there	  legal	  representation	  mentioned?	  
 Is	  there	  a	  named	  group?	  
 Is	  there	  more	  than	  one	  victim	  stakeholder	  group	  
mentioned?	  
Overall	  stakeholder	  
cohesiveness	  
 Does	  the	  stakeholder	  group	  still	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  cohesive	  
unit?	  
 Are	  there	  different	  agendas	  amongst	  stakeholders?	  
Tactical	  goals	  
 What	  were	  goals	  of	  the	  stakeholders	  mentioned	  in	  the	  
article?	  
 Are	  other	  goals	  beyond	  the	  obvious	  (money	  back	  and	  
justice	  done)	  mentioned?	  
Figure 5: Indicator Coding Template 
 
